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GOOD DEFICITS: PROTECTING THE PUBLIC
INTEREST FROM DEFICIT HYSTERIA
Neil H. Buchanan*
President Obama has come under increasingly fierce criticism for the
size of the federal budget deficit, as both Democratic and Republican
politicians loudly proclaim that federal spending should be cut. This article
explains why such anti-deficit fervor is misguided and simplistic, and why,
perhaps counter-intuitively, cutting government spending can hurt the
country, rather than help it, in both the short run and the long run.
In the short run, cutting deficit spending can be disastrous for the
economy, especially if the economy is already in a weakened state (as the
U.S. economy has been since 2008). In addition, the federal budget fails to
separate spending that provides long-term benefits to the economy — such
as spending on education and infrastructure — from spending that provides
no long-term benefits. It is, therefore, just as politically expedient to cut
valuable spending as it is to cut waste: both types of spending cuts reduce
“the deficit.” Thus, indiscriminate cuts in government spending will reduce
the deficit, but will also harm our long-term prospects.
This article proposes a novel solution to this problem: the creation of
an independent agency to fix the current incoherent and damaging
budgeting process. The proposed “Growth Budgeting Board” could
eliminate poorly timed and poorly targeted spending cuts, protect valuable
investments from the budget ax, and discipline the budgeting process to
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reduce the opportunities for political gamesmanship and abuse.
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I. INTRODUCTION
―Cutting the deficit by gutting our investments in innovation and
education is like lightening an overloaded airplane by removing its engine.
It may make you feel like you‘re flying high at first, but it won‘t take long
before you feel the impact.‖
— President Barack Obama, The State of the Union Address, 20111
―All of this new government spending was sold as ‗investment.‘ Yet
after two years, the unemployment rate remains above 9% and government
has added over $3 trillion to our debt.‖
— U.S. Rep. Paul Ryan, Official Republican Response to the State of
the Union Address, 20112
Spending by the federal government — even spending that is financed
by deficits — can improve both short-term and long-term living standards
for the citizens of the United States. This basic truth has not, unfortunately,
stopped the U.S. political system from becoming paralyzed by a fear of
deficit spending. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to say that federal deficits
were the defining issue of the first two years of Barack Obama‘s
presidency, and federal budgeting issues have become an even more
fiercely contested political battleground in the 112th Congress.
This is hardly the first time that deficits have become such a central
concern for policymakers, of course. The current environment, however, is

1

Office of the Press Sec‘y, Remarks by the President in State of Union Address, THE
WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 25, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/01/25/
remarks-president-state-union-address.
2
Transcript: GOP Response From Rep. Paul Ryan, NAT‘L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 25,
2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/26/133227396/transcript-gop-response-from-rep-paulryan.

BUCHANAN.FORMATTED.8 (FOR ONLINE EDITION ONLY)

78

Virginia Tax Review

8/31/2011 10:42 AM

[Vol. 31:75

especially toxic, with the worst economic downturn since the Great
Depression leading to extreme levels of economic pain and fear. 3 Budget
deficits are little more than an abstraction to most people, and unimaginably
large dollar figures seem to validate suspicions that something big and bad
must be going on. When combined with personal intuitions that borrowing
money must somehow be a mark of shame, it is precisely the abstract nature
of deficits that makes people fear and misunderstand them. Even anti-deficit
policies that will harm the economy can be embraced by millions of scared
and uncertain citizens.
The public‘s fear has, unsurprisingly, found a voice among the nation‘s
politicians. One Republican U.S. Senator, for example, recently claimed in
a floor debate that the current level of the federal deficit represents a
―crisis‖ that threatens the country‘s security. 4 A Democratic U.S. Senator
cited Congress‘s failure ―to deal with one of the greatest threats facing our
nation: our exploding deficits and debt‖ as one of his major reasons for
retiring in frustration from his office, 5 and he listed deficit reduction first
among the four problems that he would help the President try to solve
during his remaining time in office. 6
The constant hyping of the supposed harms flowing from budget
deficits has reached the point where being loudly critical of deficits seems
to have become a badge of seriousness, notwithstanding any particular
commentator‘s lack of expertise about economics. To note just one
example, the journalist Fareed Zakaria, who has a well-earned reputation as
a keen observer of foreign affairs, especially with regard to the wars in the
Middle East, felt comfortable inveighing against deficits in a commentary
early in 2010, even though it is far from his area of expertise. Criticizing
two prominent policymakers for failing to advocate a policy that would
address ―the black hole that is the federal budget deficit,‖7 Zakaria
3

See Bob Willis, U.S. Recession Worst Since Great Depression, Revised Data Show,
BLOOMBERG, Aug. 1, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
aNivTjr852TI.
4
Floyd Norris, Rates Fall as Market Fears Economic Weakness, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
15, 2010 (―Deficit hawks are leaning forward in the United States as well. ‗Many Americans
and most senators feel that the level of the federal debt is at crisis levels,‘ Senator Lamar
Alexander, a Tennessee Republican, said in a Senate debate last month, adding that the debt
‗threatens the security of our country.‘‖).
5
Press Release, Bayh Announces He Will Not Seek a Third Senate Term (Feb. 15,
2010), available at http://www.swiahu.org/images/PDF/Bayh%20Email.pdf.
6
Id. (listing deficit reduction first, followed by ―[getting] the economy moving
again,‖ financial reform, and educational reform).
7
Transcript, Fareed Zakaria GPS: Interview with Paul Volcker, CNN (Feb. 14,
2010), http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1002/14/fzgps.01.html.
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concluded: ―For shame.‖8 While many people might find it odd if an
economist were to weigh in on the wisdom of, say, the U.S. military‘s
withdrawal strategy from Afghanistan, there seems to be little resistance to
the idea that anyone with a microphone is qualified to denounce deficit
spending.
Predictably, this constant denunciation of deficits feeds back into
public opinion polls, with the public repeating what they have heard about
the dangers of continued budget deficits. Polls show that large numbers of
people continue to worry about budget deficits. 9 For example, a poll in
January 2010 showed over 80% of those interviewed describing themselves
as either ―very worried‖ or ―somewhat worried‖ that ―increasing federal
debt will harm the financial future of your children and grandchildren,‖ 10
while 85% were either ―angry‖ or ―bothered, but not angry‖ about ―the
11
growing federal budget deficit.‖
The drumbeat against deficit spending can be heard everywhere, not
just among the public and politicians, but among many policy
commentators as well. 12 Some commentators, in their zeal to advance
policies to reduce deficits, twist the results of public opinion polls. For
example, a poll that showed 14% of Americans identifying the deficit as
―the largest problem the country will face‖ in twenty-five years was
inaccurately (or at least misleadingly) described as showing that
―Americans Believe Deficit is Largest Looming Problem.‖ 13
8

Id.
Summing Up Public Opinion on Federal Debt and Deficits, PUB. AGENDA (Feb. 25,
2010), available at http://www.publicagenda.org/files/pdf/SummingUpPublicOpinionOn
DebtAndDeficits.pdf.
10
Id. at 2.
11
Id.
12
One of the D.C.-based think tanks that has been especially active in promoting the
idea that deficits are an enormous, pressing problem is the Committee for a Responsible
Federal Budget. This private group of former members of Congress and high-level budget
officials from both parties issues ongoing commentary to support its overall claim that the
U.S. fiscal situation must be changed — and changed quickly — through some combination
of cuts in spending and increases in taxes. Because of the pedigrees of the members of that
committee, and because it produces such a large amount of material warning against deficits,
its analyses are an especially useful source for those who wish to find the more sophisticated
versions of anti-deficit arguments. See generally THE COMMITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE
FEDERAL BUDGET, http://crfb.org/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2011).
13
Americans Believe Deficit is Largest Looming Problem, THE COMMITTEE FOR A
RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL BUDGET (Mar. 16, 2010), http://crfb.org/blogs/americans-believedeficit-largest-looming-problem. The poll merely showed that more people — one in seven
respondents — named the federal deficit as the biggest problem likely to face the country in
twenty-five years. It did not show that Americans as a whole, or even a simple majority,
9
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Even in this atmosphere of misinformation and crisis, however, it is
possible to find sensible, sober analyses of deficits, with some editorialists
attempting to put the risks and tradeoffs of deficits in some perspective. 14
Most prominent economists, moreover, generally agree that any problem
with deficits is not a matter of the deficits that are being incurred in the
midst of the current ―Great Recession‖ but is, at most, a long-term
problem. 15 As two highly regarded economists recently put it: ―Today‘s
debt problems result not from how fiscal policy was managed during the
crisis, but from how it was mismanaged before the crisis.‖16 Another
prominent economist described the hype surrounding budget deficits as
―scare tactics,‖17 drawing a pointed analogy to the hype surrounding the
build-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. 18
Even so, because the overall atmosphere in public discussions
continues to be so stridently anti-deficit, President Obama has responded to
the public‘s fears with gestures that are intended to suggest that he is taking
action, but that instead tend to validate those fears. For example, early in
believe that to be true.
14
See, e.g., Editorial¸ What They‟re Not Telling You, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 31, 2010
(―There is a lot of heated talk in Washington these days about the deficit, unfortunately little
of it serious.‖).
15
For some contrary views, see infra note 77. The most extreme theoretical claim
against the standard view of deficit spending during recessions is the (misnamed) concept of
―Ricardian Equivalence,‖ which predicts that government spending is perfectly offset by
rational taxpayers, who save dollar-for-dollar the amount of any increase in government
spending, in anticipation of future tax increases. See, e.g., Brad DeLong, An Appeal for
Help: Recent History of Economic Thought, BRAD DELONG‘S GRASPING REALITY WITH ALL
TEN TENTACLES, Apr. 5, 2009, http://delong.typepad.com/sdj/2009/04/an-appeal-for-helprecent-history-of-economic-thought.html (professor in Berkeley‘s Economics Department
saying that ―Ricardian equivalence means not just that deficit-financed tax cuts have no
short-term stimulative effects but also that deficit-financed spending increases have no shortterm stimulative effects on nominal spending,‖ and describing that claim as ―false‖).
16
Olivier Blanchard & Carlo Cottarelli, The Great False Choice, Stimulus or
Austerity, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2010 (chief economist and head of fiscal affairs at the IMF
arguing that long-term fiscal changes in most countries are much more important ―than if the
world gets 2011 plans wrong by a fraction of a percent of GDP‖).
17
Paul Krugman, Fiscal Scare Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010, at A25 (―The deficit
threatens economic recovery, we‘re told; it puts American economic stability at risk; it will
undermine our influence in the world. These claims generally aren‘t stated as opinions, as
views held by some analysts but disputed by others. Instead, they‘re reported as if they were
facts, plain and simple. Yet they aren‘t facts.‖).
18
Id. (―To me — and I‘m not alone in this — the sudden outbreak of deficit hysteria
brings back memories of the groupthink that took hold during the run-up to the Iraq war.
Now, as then, dubious allegations, not backed by hard evidence, are being reported as if they
have been established beyond a shadow of a doubt.‖).
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2010, the President proposed a freeze on federal spending in certain areas of
the budget. 19 More prominently, and perhaps of more ultimate
consequence, the President issued an executive order creating a bipartisan
commission to study the federal deficit and debt and to produce a report and
recommendation after the 2010 mid-term elections. 20
In this atmosphere, the better response to public concerns about the
deficit involves two steps. First, we need to clearly differentiate short-run
changes in the deficit from long-run changes and guarantee that short-run
policies will truly be limited to the short-run. This will allow policymakers
to respond to recessions with appropriate levels and types of fiscal stimulus
(i.e., ―good deficits‖), without fear of being told that it is unacceptable to
add to ―the deficit.‖ Second, we need to remind ourselves that long-run
deficits can also be good, so long as they are spent on projects that represent
an investment in the nation‘s future productivity, and we need to put in
place mechanisms that will increase the government‘s long-term
investments in the economy.
This article, while acknowledging the dangers of certain types and
levels of federal deficit spending, describes the conditions under which
deficit spending can be ―good‖ — that is, when deficits will improve the
economy‘s performance and people‘s standards of living — in both the
short-run and the long-run. Given the inability of the U.S. political system
to deal with budget issues in a coherent manner — or even to understand
them — I propose the adoption of an independent federal agency charged
with providing essential guidance regarding government spending and
19

Lori Montgomery, Obama to Propose Freeze on Government Spending, WASH.
POST, Jan. 26, 2010 (―Under mounting pressure to rein in mammoth budget deficits,
President Obama will propose in his State of the Union address a three-year freeze on federal
funding that is not related to national security, a concession to public concern about
government spending that could dramatically curtail Obama‘s legislative ambitions.‖). Note
the use of the loaded adjective ―mammoth‖ in what is supposed to be a news article, not an
editorial.
20
Exec. Order NO. 13,531, 75 Fed. Reg. 7, 927 (Feb. 23, 2010), available at
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2010/pdf/2010-3725.pdf; see also Alex Kingsbury, Obama
Creates a Commission to Shrink the Deficit, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 22, 2010
(―There‘s an old maxim in Washington that when politicians are either unable or unwilling
to tackle a problem directly, they appoint a commission to give the issue more intensive
study. So it was last week when President Obama created the National Commission on
Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, a bipartisan group of 18 souls charged with solving
perhaps the country‘s most vexing and pressing public-policy problem — red ink.‖). That
commission‘s report was, indeed, issued shortly after the November 2010 elections. See THE
NAT‘L COMM‘N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY AND REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH (2010),
available at http://www.fiscalcommission.gov/sites/fiscalcommission.gov/files/documents/
TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf.
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taxation. Specifically, the agency — the ―Growth Budgeting Board‖ —
would be empowered to identify those budgetary items (both spending
programs and tax cuts) that could responsibly be financed through increases
in the public debt. With such a board in place, it would be possible to stop
making foolish decisions about spending — decisions that in the current
environment are based on little more than intuition and superstition — and
instead to allow policy to be based on clear understandings of how the
deficit affects the economy, both now and in the future.
II. BUDGET DEFICITS: WHAT THEY ARE, AND HOW BIG THEY SHOULD BE
Studying the connections between fiscal deficits and economic
prosperity is one of the foundational purposes of modern
macroeconomics.21 As the discussion above demonstrates, there is a
recurring focus within U.S. political and policy circles on reducing the
federal government‘s budget deficit, a focus that has become especially
intense in the last two years. The issue is usually presented as a matter of
high national priority, often presented in moral terms and almost invariably
described as a matter of protecting the country‘s long-term economic
22
health. The idea is to force reluctant politicians to make ―tough choices‖
that might not be popular, but that are necessary for the good of the country,
the economy, and ―our children and grandchildren.‖ What is usually
missing from such calls for austerity, however, is any but the most casual
explanation of why deficits matter, much less how to determine the
appropriate level of the federal deficit.
These issues are anything but simple. There are several competing
candidates for the right way to measure deficits,23 and there is a dearth of
positive guidance from macroeconomic theory to tell us what the deficit
should be in any given year or over longer periods of time. There is,
21

See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder, Is the National Debt Really — I Mean, Really — a
Burden?, in DEBT AND THE TWIN DEFICITS DEBATE 209, 219 (James M. Rock ed., 1991);
Neil H. Buchanan, Is It Sometimes Good to Run Budget Deficits? If So, Should We Admit It
(Out Loud)?, 26 VA. TAX REV. 325, 335–37 (2006) [hereinafter Buchanan, Sometimes
Good?].
22
See, e.g., Gray Rohrer, George LeMieux: We Can, We Must, Balance Federal
Budget, SUNSHINE ST. NEWS, Aug.12, 2010, http://www.sunshinestatenews.com/story/
george-lemieux-we-can-we-must-balance-federal-budget (reporting Robert Bixby‘s claim
that the deficit is ―not a numbers issue, it‘s a moral issue‖).
23
See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, Debt, Deficits, and Fiscal Policy: Three Essays (1996)
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Harvard University), ch. 1 [hereinafter Debt, Deficits, and
Fiscal] (discussing thirteen different ways to measure government deficits — a discussion
that did not purport to cover all of the possibilities).
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however, some very important negative guidance from macroeconomic
theory. That is, even though we do not know what the right answer is, we
can rule out some widely believed wrong answers. In the end, however,
several possible deficit targets are not obviously wrong, making the debate
about ―responsible‖ budgets much more difficult than it might initially
appear.
A. Measuring Deficits and Debt
Before beginning to analyze the various approaches to government
budget management, it is important to highlight the difference between
deficits and debt. A deficit is the difference in a given time period (usually a
year) between the amount of money that the federal government spends and
the amount of money that it receives. 24 (A negative deficit, with revenues
exceeding expenditures, is called a surplus.) If the federal government runs
a deficit in a given year, the U.S. Treasury finances that deficit by selling
government securities to ―the public,‖ which includes all non-federalgovernment entities,25 including private individuals, state and local
governments, private corporations, financial institutions (pension funds,
mutual funds, banks, etc.), and foreign governments. By contrast, the
federal debt is the total amount of money that the federal government owes
at a given time to those other entities, also called ―debt held by the
26
public.‖ The debt is thus the accumulated value, at any point in time, of
all previous annual deficits (less previous annual surpluses), plus
accumulated interest on the money borrowed.
The deficit, therefore, is financed by an increase in the outstanding debt
of the federal government. Entities lend money to the U.S. government by
24

This measure of the deficit is also called the ―cash-flow deficit,‖ because it simply
measures the difference between money flowing into the government and money flowing out
of the government during a given year.
25
For purposes of budget accounting, however, the Federal Reserve System is
considered to be part of ―the public.‖
26
The U.S. ―national debt‖ is typically expressed in two forms: as the total value of all
Treasury securities that have been issued and not redeemed, or as the total value of the
Treasury securities held outside of the federal government. Because federal agencies hold
large amounts of securities issued by the U.S. Treasury — which is merely another federal
agency — this internal accounting procedure is akin to merely keeping an IOU in one pocket
that promises to transfer money at some point from another pocket. That is, the overall
federal debt is not affected by these internal accounting procedures. On August 19, 2010, the
total federal debt (including debt held internally by federal agencies) was $13.4 trillion, or
92% of GDP; but the debt held by the public was $8.8 trillion, or 60% of GDP. See
TREASURY DIRECT : THE DEBT TO THE PENNY AND WHO HOLDS IT, http://www.treasurydirect.
gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np (last visited Aug. 21, 2010).

BUCHANAN.FORMATTED.8 (FOR ONLINE EDITION ONLY)

84

Virginia Tax Review

8/31/2011 10:42 AM

[Vol. 31:75

buying Treasury securities that legally obligate the federal government to
repay the borrowed funds, with interest, at a specific date or dates in the
future. These securities, often called ―Treasuries‖ because they are issued
by the United States Department of the Treasury, carry the full faith and
credit of the United States government. They are simply loan instruments,
with a private party exchanging money today for the promise of money in
the future.
Understanding the fundamental difference between deficit and debt is
necessary to understand even the most basic issues regarding fiscal
budgeting. In addition, there are several important nuances regarding the
27
measurement of deficits and debt. For example, it is essential not to
discuss deficits and debt in dollar terms but as the percent of the nation‘s
income that they represent. This is because richer borrowers are better
positioned to repay any given amount of debt than poorer borrowers would
be. 28 For purposes of discussing government debt, the best measure of
national income is the gross domestic product.29 This means, for example,
that the $160.7 billion deficit in 2007 was much smaller than the $149.7
billion deficit in 1987, because GDP was $13,896 billion in 2007 but only
$4,651 billion in 1987, making the debt-to-GDP ratios in those years 1.2%

27

For a short discussion of the various issues discussed here, see Neil H. Buchanan, If
We Must Obsess About Budget Deficits, Can We At Least Measure Them Correctly?,
FINDLAW, Jan. 28, 2010, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/buchanan/20100128.html [hereinafter
Buchanan, If We Must Obsess]. There is also a method of measuring deficits that focuses on
aggregating all future deficits into a single number, rather than measuring deficits year by
year. This is discussed and critiqued in Neil H. Buchanan, Social Security, Generational
Justice, and Long-Term Deficits, 58 TAX L. REV. 275, 291 (2005) [hereinafter Buchanan,
Long-Term Deficits]. The analysis herein will not further address issues related to that
alternative measurement of national indebtedness.
28
U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FEDERAL DEBT : ANSWERS TO FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS: AN UPDATE (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04485
sp.pdf (―The amount of any borrower‘s debt by itself is not a good indicator of the burden
imposed by that debt. A borrower‘s income and wealth are important in assessing the burden
of debt. Therefore, to get a sense of the burden represented by the federal debt, that debt is
often measured in relation to the nation‘s income.‖); see also Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits,
supra note 27, at 289–91.
29
There are various measures of an economy‘s annual income, but the most common
measure is Gross Domestic Product, or GDP. U.S. GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 28, at 7. (―Gross domestic product (GDP) is a commonly used measure of domestic
national income. GDP is the value of all goods and services produced within the United
States in a given year and is conceptually equivalent to incomes earned in production. It is a
rough indicator of the economic earnings base from which the government draws its
revenues.‖).
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and 3.2% respectively.30
While discussions of the U.S. budget deficit almost always focus on the
federal government to the exclusion of state and local governments, there is
no valid theoretical reason to separate the government‘s effects on the
economy on the basis of our federal form of government. If the government
spends, it does not matter for macroeconomic purposes whether that
spending comes from a state, a city, or any other government entity. 31
Because states and cities currently face severe budget difficulties, their
efforts to raise taxes and cut spending substantially offset some or all of the
federal government‘s actions. For example, ―when the federal government
was adding $234 billion in 2008 to the . . . deficit in order to fight the
worsening recession, states were cutting $193 billion.‖ 32 The net difference
was $41 billion, less than 0.3% of GDP, making the overall impact of the
federal government‘s efforts to help the economy much smaller than they
appeared.
Most important, the federal deficit automatically rises when the
economy shrinks, because as people lose jobs, they pay fewer dollars in
taxes and receive more dollars in government assistance. The size of this
effect can be substantial. For example, in 2009, when the federal deficit
rose by $955 billion, or 6.7% of GDP, almost one-third of that change was
due to the decline in revenues and increase in expenditures that
accompanied the worsening recession. 33 More generally, in the six
recessions that preceded the current downturn, the deficit rose on average
by 2.2% of GDP, but almost three-quarters of that amount (1.6%) was due
to cyclical changes in the economy. 34
From the standpoint of deficit policy, therefore, it is essential during a
recession for the government to take account of how much of the change in
the deficit is due to the worsening economy. This is known as the
―standardized employment deficit‖ or the ―cyclical deficit,‖ which measures

30

CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: HISTORICAL BUDGET
DATA, tbls. F-1, F-11, F-2 (2010), available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10871/
HistoricalTables.pdf.
31
See Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 27, at 291.
32
Buchanan, If We Must Obsess, supra note 27.
33
Id.
34
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: FISCAL YEARS 2008
TO 2018, app. at 129, box C-1, (2008), available at http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/89xx/doc8917/0123-2008_BudgetOutlook.pdf. Note that the denominator for these percentages is ―potential
GDP,‖ which is the level of GDP that would have been produced had the economy not been
in a recession.
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how large the deficit would have been but for the recession.35 In addition,
any temporary spending that is incurred to fight the deficit, but that will not
continue after the recession is over, must be separated from the rest of the
deficit. Only if those two adjustments are made can spending and taxing
policy be undertaken with a clear understanding of the various reasons that
the deficit has risen during a recession.
The current political environment fails to differentiate between deficits
that are due to long-term imbalances, deficits that are due to short-term
passive effects of the economy on spending and revenues, and deficits
undertaken specifically to reverse an economic downturn on a temporary
basis. In this article, I argue that it is essential to have a government agency
to provide relevant guidance to Congress.
B. The Possible Harms of Fiscal Deficits
As discussed above, there are a number of plausible methods to
measure the official ―deficit‖ of the U.S. government, and the most
commonly cited measure (the ―cash-flow deficit‖) is not a particularly
strong one. 36 Even so, the standard political debate in the U.S. takes as a
given that the deficit is too high, and therefore that the level of government
spending must be cut, or that taxes must be increased, or both. For some
politicians, however, tax increases are off the table, for reasons that are not
37
germane to this discussion. In any case, calls to bring the deficit (however
measured) under control imply some combination of lower government
spending and higher taxes. Before continuing, therefore, it is important to
discuss the potential benefits of reducing deficits, that is, the arguments
against deficits.38

35

Id.
Buchanan, If We Must Obsess, supra note 27.
37
See, e.g., David Edwards & Daniel Tencer, Sen. Kyl: $678-billion Tax Break for
Rich Should not be Offset, THE RAW STORY (July 11, 2010), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/
2010/07/11/kyl-you-offset-tax-cuts/ (U.S. Senate Minority Whip arguing ―you should never
raise taxes in order to cut taxes‖). In addition, some politicians continue to assert that tax
cuts do not increase the deficit at all. See, e.g., Luke Johnson, Marco Rubio: Tax Cuts Pay
for Themselves While Unemployment Benefits Don‟t, THE FLA. INDEP., July 20, 2010,
http://floridaindependent.com/4319/marco-rubio-tax-cuts-pay-for-themselves-whileunemployment-benefits-don%E2%80%99t. Some readers will recognize this argument as
the so-called Laffer Curve, which has been broadly rejected by the economics profession.
See, e.g., Buchanan, Sometimes Good?, supra note 21, at 341 (quoting N. Gregory Mankiw
as having ―ridiculed the supply-side tax policies of President Ronald Reagan as the work of
‗charlatans and cranks.‘‖).
38
The harms from cutting deficits are discussed in Part III below.
36
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Deficits, National Bankruptcy, and Inflation

While there are, as noted above, many calls to reduce deficit spending
that seem to flow from the unexamined belief that there is something
intrinsically wrong with running deficits, there are a number of substantive
claims about the harms of deficit spending that deserve scrutiny. While
some of these concerns turn out to be baseless, they are at least attempts to
put something behind the generalized hysteria against deficit spending.
Other concerns are much more substantive; and while they do not support
arguments to eliminate federal deficits, they do serve the important function
of helping to determine the possible limits of budget deficits and the
tradeoffs that reducing budget deficits would imply.
The claim that the United States government will go ―bankrupt‖ if it
continues to run deficits is — despite its repetition by opponents of deficits
— simply incorrect as a technical matter. 39 All Treasury securities are
denominated in U.S. dollars, which means that the promises embodied in
Treasuries can be honored so long as the United States Treasury has dollars
with which to pay its debts. Given that the central bank of the United States,
the Federal Reserve System (more commonly known simply as the Fed),
has the power to create dollars, it is not possible for the federal government
ever to run out of dollars. Treasury securities will always be repaid.
The federal government‘s ability to create money means that there is
no risk of default to a holder of a Treasury security. The borrowed money
will be repaid, which is why financial institutions are willing to hold
Treasuries as the equivalent of cash in their portfolios.40 Although such
securities generally pay interest, the rates can be so low that the holders of
Treasuries are investing their money for a virtually zero rate of return. This
has been the case with very short-term Treasury securities for the last few
years. The willingness of investors to hold Treasuries even without earning
interest is testament to the confidence that investors have in the full faith
and credit of the United States government. Investors are lending money to
the government, and the only thing that they receive in return is the
guarantee that the government will pay them back in full, in dollars.
It is possible, of course, for the Fed to create so much money that it
creates inflation. The risk of inflation is heightened when the economy is
operating at full capacity, as well as by very large increases in the amount
of money in circulation. While this danger is always present in a modern
39

The discussion in this section draws extensively on Blinder, supra note 21.
It is possible that the money that is repaid will not have the same buying power as
the money that the lender expected, as discussed below. Inflation risk is, however, distinct
from default risk.
40
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economy, there is very little evidence that the Fed has ever come close to
increasing the rate of inflation by creating too much money in response to
the federal budget deficit. For example, during the Reagan administration,
annual federal deficits were higher than at any time since World War II, yet
the inflation rate fell from double-digit rates at the beginning of the 1980‘s
and remained in the range of one to six percent for the rest of the decade. 41
Similarly, outstanding federal debt has increased to sixty percent of GDP
during the Great Recession years of 2008 through 2010, yet there is no
evidence of an emerging problem with inflation. Not only has there been no
hyper-inflation or even accelerating rates of inflation, but the inflation rate
is near zero and trending downward. If anything, the bigger worry is not
inflation but deflation.
Nonetheless, the risk of inflation does mean that there are prudential
limits on deficit spending, with extraordinarily large deficits being a sure
path to hyper-inflation. Unfortunately, the value (or even the range) of the
upper limit on money growth is currently unknown. 42 Any reasonable
government would guard against such an outcome, but the U.S. experience
suggests that there is minimal danger of even the current high levels of the
budget deficit leading to excessive monetary growth and ultimately creating
an increase in inflation.
2.

Deficits, Investment, and Future Prosperity

While the risk of igniting inflation due to deficit spending is thankfully
small, a more likely harm from deficit spending lies in a concept known as
―crowding out.‖43 One of the fundamental insights motivating standard
macroeconomic models is that, when a government buys or produces goods
or services, it generally competes for resources with the private sector.
When the government hires workers to build a dam, for example, those
workers become unavailable to private contractors who might have used
41

See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS: DATABASES, TABLES, & CALCULATORS BY
SUBJECT, http://data.bls.gov/PDQ/servlet/SurveyOutputServlet (last visited Apr. 15, 2011).
42
Needless to say, there is a large economic literature that attempts to identify the
relationship between monetary expansion and inflation. The most that can currently be said
is that monetary expansion can lead to inflation after a lag. On the other hand, the recent
experience in which the Fed expanded one of its monetary control variables by historic
margins, with no subsequent uptick in inflation, suggests that the relationship between
monetary expansion and inflation is loose and imprecise. See, e.g., Neil H. Buchanan, How
is Money Created? Debunking Some Myths About Recent Policies to Stabilize the Financial
System and the Economy, FINDLAW, June 18, 2009, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/buchanan/
20090618.html.
43
See Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 27, at 311.
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them to build a factory. A government‘s spending decisions, therefore, can
prevent private businesses from investing in productive capital projects.
The basic concern is that the federal government might reduce future
living standards by reducing the private capital stock (factories, equipment,
etc.) that will be available in future years to generate income for American
business owners and their employees. This can happen when the federal
government borrows money and then hires existing capital and workers to
produce (either directly or indirectly) current consumption goods rather
than capital goods for the future.44 The form of crowding out differs,
depending upon whether deficits are financed with dollars borrowed from
domestic or foreign sources; but no matter who finances the government‘s
borrowing, the result under this theory is that the future incomes of
American citizens will be lower than they would otherwise be.45
As discussed in Sec. III.C. below, the crowding out story is
considerably more complicated than the brief description here suggests. At
this point, however, the important lesson is that deficits today can be
harmful tomorrow, if they cause the capital stock to be lower than it would
otherwise be.
3.

Deficits and the Risks of a Financial Crisis

Finally, it is possible that U.S. deficits could become so large for so
long that financial markets collectively would lose confidence in the
country‘s fiscal position. Indeed, it is precisely this scary possibility that
many commentators have invoked in recent years as a reason to reduce the
U.S. fiscal deficit. 46 The idea is that there is no telling when the financial
44

It is also possible for the government‘s borrowing to crowd out private consumption,
rather than private investment. If it does, then there will be no reduction in future
productivity or living standards, because private consumption is merely being replaced by
government consumption (consumption that will ultimately benefit private individuals). The
mix of consumption will thus change, but there will be no crowding out of the capital stock.
45
If the government‘s borrowing reduces the actual capital stock, then the future
output of the economy will be lower than otherwise. If the government borrows from foreign
sources, thus allowing domestic saving to be used to build the capital stock to the levels that
it otherwise would have reached, then the interest on the debt to foreigners will, in essence,
drain the increased future income that such capital would create. This means, in essence, that
borrowing from abroad allows the U.S. to accumulate more capital, but that the income from
that capital does not benefit domestic citizens. This is the equivalent of crowding out the
capital stock directly. See generally Blinder, supra note 21.
46
See, e.g., Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, Debt Crisis Looming;
Political and Market Risks Run Large, COMM. RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET BLOG (May 6,
2010), http://crfb.org/blogs/debt-crisis-looming-political-and-market-risks-run-large
[hereinafter ―Debt Crisis Looming‖] (―Yesterday, The Committee for a Responsible Federal
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markets will suddenly stop accepting trades in U.S. Treasury securities.
Financial crises in other countries in the relatively recent past have been
painful,47 and those crises arguably began without warning. If the U.S.
government were to push its deficit to levels today and — much more
important — in the future that would be viewed as unsustainable, then the
resolution of that policy failure could be swift and harsh.48
Although it is true that a fiscal crisis could erupt at any time, with the
financial markets forcing a sudden policy adjustment to prevent projected
future imbalances from coming into being, 49 the consequences of long-term
fiscal imbalance could instead be felt gradually, with deficits reducing
living standards over the space of years or decades. Large predicted deficits
could — rather than bringing on a sudden crisis — result in rising interest
rates on government debt, as financial investors begin to build the
possibility of much higher inflation — and even a historically
unprecedented U.S. default on its obligations50 — into the prices (and thus
the rates of return) of Treasury securities.
Clearly, the gradual path is preferable to the sudden change. Just as
clearly, however, no one knows how to predict whether, when, or how a
fiscal crisis could emerge. One possible response to such uncertainty is to
call for immediate action to prevent any such future crisis. 51 It is not,
Budget hosted a chilling conference on ‗What a Fiscal Crisis Would Look Like in the U.S.‘
An all-star group discussed: what a tipping point might be; how a crisis might unfold; and
what policies would be best to avoid a crisis. There was a clear consensus in the room that
without changes, a crisis [is] inevitable.‖).
47
The most prominent recent example is Greece. See, e.g., Norris, supra note 4
(―Much of the new international worry about government spending was prompted by the
Greek debt crisis this year. It avoided default only with help from other European countries.
That aid was conditioned on Greece agreeing to a strong austerity program, to be monitored
by a group including representatives of the International Monetary Fund.‖).
48
Debt Crisis Looming, supra note 46 (―If investors lose confidence in the U.S.,
interest rates will soar, job creation will slow and the financial health of Americans will
deteriorate.‖).
49
Norris, supra note 4 (―[I]n the late 1970s and early 1980s . . . ‗bond vigilantes‘ were
reluctant to invest in United States Treasury securities because they feared runaway
inflation. Their refusal drove up the interest rates the government had to pay on its
borrowings and eventually led the Federal Reserve, under Paul A. Volcker, to wage war
against inflation even if it meant choking off economic growth.‖).
50
Although the discussion in Part II.B.1. showed that the United States government
can always create the money necessary to pay its debts, it is at least possible to imagine that
a government in the future could choose default over hyper-inflation for strategic reasons.
51
See, e.g., CRFB Holds Fortuitous Conference on Fiscal Crisis Scenarios, COMM.
FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET, 2 (May 6, 2010) (―While it is impossible to precisely
predict the ‗tipping point‘ for a crisis, taking credible steps now is the best way to prevent
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however, possible to reduce the probability of a market crisis to zero. In the
face of such uncertainty, one could simply call for action sooner rather than
later, in the belief that waiting will only make matters worse. 52
The risk of a crisis, however, hinges crucially on the psychology of
markets looking forward for decades. No one doubts that the United States
government could borrow trillions of dollars in any given year or set of
years, without setting off a financial crisis, but if there is no long-term plan
to manage the level of debt, then financial market participants could decide
at any point that those future risks have become so worrisome that it is
unwise to own U.S. government debt.53 The rush to sell that debt could be
chaotic, with dire consequences for the U.S. and global economies.
This aspect of the problem — that it is the expected path of future
borrowing that determines the likelihood of a financial crisis, rather than the
size of the deficit this year (or even for the next ten or twenty years) —
leads some analysts to suggest that the problem for U.S. policymakers is to
find a way to reassure financial market participants today that the debt
problem will ultimately be brought under control.54 This ―announcement
effect‖55 means that a government with a convincing long-term plan to
manage deficits and debt can deal with short-term problems by running
deficits, safe in the knowledge that the financial markets expect deficits to
return to sustainable levels after the short-term problems are under control.
While it might seem to be a simple matter of prudent management to
reduce the risks of a fiscal crisis, it is essential to remember that it is
anything but costless to reduce fiscal imbalances. These costs include, as
discussed below, increases in current unemployment, reductions in current
incomes, and general economic decline.56 Calls to reduce deficits as a way
to avoid fiscal crises, therefore, imply an underlying judgment that the costs
of deficit reduction will be lower than the probability-adjusted benefits of
avoiding a financial crisis.
it.‖), available at http://crfb.org/sites/default/files/CRFB_Holds_Fortuitous_Conference_0.
pdf.
52
Id. at 1 (―The longer we wait to act, the greater the number of things that could set
off a crisis.‖).
53
Debt Crisis Looming, supra note 46 (arguing that ―the financial markets are based
on faith and that the fiscal standing of the United States will drop when people lose faith that
policymakers can control fiscal matters‖).
54
Id. (―The key is to make a commitment to a credible plan now.‖).
55
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, Announcing the “Announcement
Effect Club,” COMM. RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET BLOG (Jan. 14, 2010), http://crfb.org/blogs/
announcing-announcement-effect-club.
56
ROBERT EISNER, THE GREAT DEFICIT SCARES: THE FEDERAL BUDGET, TRADE, AND
SOCIAL SECURITY 3–28, 57–58 (1997).
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If the justification for enacting restrictive fiscal policy now is to reduce
the likelihood of a fiscal crisis, however, then we must at least have some
way of knowing how much we can reduce that likelihood by taking action
now. Moreover, if participants in the financial markets were really
convinced that the current fiscal path was (or were on the brink of
becoming) unsustainable, there should be evidence that things are moving
in the wrong direction. Yet that is simply not happening. Indeed, despite
repeated warnings from anti-deficit commentators that a U.S. financial
crisis is inevitable, interest rates have fallen this year.57 ―[F]or now, the
financial markets seem to fear recession and deflation much more than they
fear deficit spending.‖58
Even so, what we are currently experiencing might be a brief calm
before the storm. We might, after all, be only moments away from the onset
of a crisis. Of course, that is always possible, no matter the situation. False
Cassandras are not difficult to find, in any situation. Moreover, even if we
knew when financial traders might decide that the government‘s long-term
budget situation looks excessively risky, there is no way to know what a
government must do to convince doubtful financial traders that it will take
future actions that will solve the problems that have been predicted.
A government could announce, for example, a budget plan that shows
long-term sustainability, but financial traders could doubt that various
elements of that plan will be enacted and sustained. Even a government that
ran short-term annual surpluses, allowing the government to pay down debt,
could discover to its surprise that it has not done enough to please financial
traders, if those traders decide as a group that the government‘s fiscal
situation might reverse itself at some point. Just as there is no way of
knowing when a crisis might come, there is no way of knowing how to
prevent a crisis from occurring or how to satisfy the people who might
59
bring the crisis upon us. There is, in the end, no way to predict what will
satisfy the psychology of a large group of financial traders.
57

Norris, supra note 4 (―It would be disastrous if either [the United States or the
United Kingdom] got to the point that investors abandoned it, or even drove up interest rates
sharply by scaling back their support. But precisely the opposite has happened this year.‖).
58
Id.; see also Paul Krugman, Appeasing the Bond Gods, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/20/opinion/20krugman.html?_r=1&ref=paulkrugman
(―But the argument [that we must appease bond vigilantes] has become even stranger
recently, as it has become clear that investors aren‘t worried about deficits; they‘re worried
about stagnation and deflation. And they‘ve been signaling that concern by driving interest
rates on the debt of major economies lower, not higher. On Thursday, the rate on 10-year
U.S. bonds was only 2.58 percent.‖).
59
See Krugman, supra note 58 (ridiculing the idea that ―the bond vigilantes may be
invisible, but they must be feared all the same‖).
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As it stands, therefore, no one knows how to assess the likelihood of a
financial crisis at any particular moment, much less how much that
likelihood changes in response to specific policy changes. The most that we
can say is that fiscal cutbacks would probably reduce the likelihood of a
fiscal crisis by some amount. 60 That, however, is hardly sufficient to guide
any responsible policy decisions to reduce budget deficits (through cuts in
social programs, Medicare, Social Security, or anything else). Even though
it seems entirely plausible that most of those who somberly call for
immediate sacrifice in the name of avoiding a fiscal crisis do so in good
faith, therefore, there is a difference between good intentions and complete
analysis.
Consider an analogy: increasing the height of a levee by one foot will
reduce the likelihood of a flood, but unless we know how to measure the
reduction in that likelihood, then we are not in a position to decide whether
to undertake the necessary costs of building up the flood wall. Arguing that
another foot will reduce the odds of catastrophe simply misses the larger
point, because the same logic would lead to calls to add three feet, six feet,
or fifty feet. Counseling ―prudence‖ can sound very good when discussed
out of context, but that is no guide for policy.
Policy makers should, of course, constantly monitor the situation for
signs of a possible crisis, and they should support efforts to expand our
knowledge of how fiscal crises come about. As it stands, however, the
argument that we should make immediate or long-term spending cuts (or
tax increases) in order to prevent a possible fiscal crisis cannot be a
meaningful guide to calibrating actual changes in policy.
These shortcomings do not mean that the government can simply
ignore long-term concerns, of course, but it is important to bear in mind that
the threat of a financial crisis can be constantly invoked by those who wish,
as an a priori matter, to force the government to adopt more restrictive
fiscal policies.
Budget deficits, therefore, have the potential to cause both short-term
and long-term damage to an economy. Any government would want to
manage those risks prudently. Doing so, however, requires that it take into
account the costs of adopting more restrictive fiscal policies. Those costs
are discussed below, after a brief discussion of how the government might
set targets for its annual borrowing.

60

Id.
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C. Deficit Targets
The key question facing any government budgeter is how to determine
what the appropriate relationship should be, if any, between revenues and
expenditures. If there were no reason to think about them together, then it
would be possible simply to determine how much money to spend on roads,
armies, pollution control, unemployment benefits, cancer research, copier
paper, and so on — and separately to determine how much money to raise
from taxes on estates, cigarettes, income, real property, sugary drinks,
gambling, consumption, pollution, and any other possible targets of
taxation. Even if there were no reason to worry about the balance or
imbalance between spending and revenues, there would still be reasons not
to spend money on wasteful or foolish projects, just as there would still be
reasons to impose taxes (such as a desire to discourage smoking), even if
revenues were not needed to fund the government. In such a world,
however, the difference between expenditures and revenues would be a
mere residual, not interesting as a matter of policy.
In the world in which we live, of course, there are limits on how far out
of balance a government‘s expenditures and revenues can be. In the
extreme, if the government were to choose never to raise money through
any means other than borrowing, its revenues would equal zero, and there
would never be any money available to pay back lenders except by
borrowing from other lenders. This is unsustainable, which means that there
must be some limit to how much the government can borrow in the
aggregate.
In addition to technical limits on the ability of a national government to
borrow money, there are also prudential limits. Even though, as explained
below, it is possible to borrow large amounts of money in a sustainable
way, there might be undesirable consequences from doing so that could
overwhelm any positive effects of taxing less than one spends.
Therefore, the central issue of public finance is to determine the best
combination of revenues and expenditures, taking into account the effects
of deficits and surpluses on the economy‘s current and longer-range
61
performance. While intuition and conventional wisdom often suggest that
the government cannot and should not borrow money, at least not for long,
that is definitively not what economic theory teaches us. In fact, there are
several ways to define ―balance‖ in the government‘s finances, each of
which carries a different technical meaning, as well as a different
implication for taxing and spending policy.

61

See generally JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE & PUBLIC POLICY (3rd ed. 2010).
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Balanced Budgets

The term ―balanced budget‖ is bandied about quite loosely in political
discussion, usually invoked as the only truly responsible target for federal
budgetary policy. Taken seriously, this would mean that the federal
government would be required to raise exactly as much money in taxes each
year as it spends, at least within a (presumably very small) margin for error.
The case for balanced annual budgets is frequently based on analogies to a
family‘s finances, with the notion being that a responsible family must pay
its bills, and so must a responsible government.62
There are, however, several serious issues that would flow from
adopting a balanced budget target, beginning with the question of the
proper time period over which balance must occur. As discussed above, the
U.S. federal deficit is usually expressed as an annual measure, but it can be
measured over any period of time, from as little as one day up to any length
of time that one likes (including an infinite time horizon). 63 Even if one
believes that the budget should be balanced in the sense that revenues must
equal expenditures, therefore, there is no reason why that balance must be
achieved each year, as opposed to each month, decade, or century.
More fundamentally, the problem with balanced budgets as a target for
policy is that they do not address the problem that is most often attributed to
government deficits. That is, if a government should not owe money to
anyone, then an annually balanced budget will only achieve that goal if the
government began with no debt. With U.S. debt held by the public set to
exceed ten trillion dollars by the time this article has been published,
however, an annually balanced budget would merely lock in place the
aggregate amount of federal debt that exists at the beginning of the new
budget balancing regime. Even though such a policy might please its
adherents by at least not adding to the debt, the existing debt would remain
unpaid. Therefore, if it is overall debt that is bad, and not merely annual
deficits, then a government that currently owes money to anyone must not
only raise enough money to pay for its current expenditures, but it must also
collect enough money to pay down the existing debt.
Even that strategy, however, leaves open the enormous question of how
quickly to reduce overall indebtedness. Given that tax increases and
62

See, e.g., Robert Hurt Wins Endorsements from the Register and Bee, News and
Advance, and Richmond Times-Dispatch, ROBERTHURTFORCONGRESS.COM, Oct. 24, 2010,
http://www.roberthurtforcongress.com/2010/10/robert-hurt-wins-endorsements-from-theregister-and-bee-news-and-advance-and-richmond-times-dispatch/.
63
See Buchanan, Long-Term Deficits, supra note 27 (critiquing a proposal to measure
the net present value of all future spending and revenues into the infinite future).
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reductions in spending tend to shrink the economy (at least in the short
run),64 a government that wishes to reduce its overall debt must balance that
desire against the danger of creating (or worsening) a recession or
depression. Given current debt levels, efforts to pay down the entire debt in
large chunks would be economically disastrous. Even if the economy were
not already facing high unemployment and the possibility of a second round
of economic decline, and even if the annual deficit were already at zero, the
prospect of finding even a relatively modest sum like $300 billion each year
— which would allow the federal government to pay down the total federal
debt over several decades — would be quite difficult politically. And as
discussed later, this fiscal contraction would put downward pressure on the
economy and upward pressure on unemployment, not just in the first year
but in every year of the government‘s efforts to wring an extra $300 billion
out of the economy to pay down federal debt.
In short, proposals to reduce deficits — much less to reduce or erase all
outstanding government debt — must be evaluated in terms of their
tradeoffs. As we reduce deficits and debt, we need to understand why we
are doing so, in order to know whether the benefits justify the costs of fiscal
contraction. While the discussion to this point has simply taken the desire to
reduce deficits and/or debt as a given, it is important to examine arguments
in favor of deficit reduction that go beyond simple-minded beliefs that
deficits and debt are per se bad. As the discussion below will demonstrate,
all such arguments result not in policies to eliminate government deficits
and debt but in policies for limiting deficits and debt. That is, even the
strongest arguments against deficit spending will, if taken seriously, result
in deficits and debt continuing into the indefinite future.
2.

Percentage Targets and the Debt-to-Income Ratio

Beyond simple-minded attempts to set the annual deficit to zero, there
are several more sophisticated ways to determine a deficit target. Many
economists refer to an annual limit on the deficit of 3% of GDP; for
example, President Obama‘s outgoing budget advisor argued late last year
that ―in 2015, 2016, 2017, we need to get to something around 3 percent of
65
the economy so that debt is no longer rising as a share of the economy.‖
The idea, therefore, is to run an annual deficit that will add to the debt,
but not to do so in a way that increases the ratio of overall national debt to
GDP. One of President George W. Bush‘s chief economic advisors, N.
64

See supra Part III.B.
Mike Dorning, Orszag Seeks Budget Deficit of 3 Percent of GDP in Six Years,
BLOOMBERG, Nov. 17, 2009.
65
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Gregory Mankiw, a conservative economist who has returned to the
Economics Department at Harvard University, also endorses the constant
debt-to-GDP ratio as a target: ―[E]ven in the long run, a balanced budget is
too strict a standard. Because of technological progress, population growth
and inflation, the nation‘s income and tax base grows over time. If the
government‘s debts grow at or below that pace, servicing the debt will not
become a major problem.‖66 The government can, therefore, ―run budget
deficits in perpetuity, as long as they are not too large.‖67
There are two difficulties even with this much more reasonable
standard, however. First, the 3% target is entirely arbitrary and is not a good
68
guide for long-term deficits. Even though that specific target is officially
the limit for all members of the European Union, 69 there is no reason to
believe that that number will keep the debt-to-GDP ratio constant.70 Indeed,
if GDP were to rise by 5% annually (which would be the result of targeted
real growth of 3% and an inflation target of 2%), then the debt could also
grow by 5% without increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio. Attempts to meet an
annual 3% target, therefore, would only coincidentally succeed in keeping
the debt-to-GDP ratio constant.
More fundamentally, there is no reason to believe that the current ratio
of national debt to GDP is the ―right‖ percentage. Yet an effort to keep the
debt-to-GDP ratio constant would, if successful, enshrine the current
arbitrary level as a policy ideal. If the recent increase in deficits was really
harmful, then should we not try to return to the level of debt-to-GDP that
existed before the recession began? Or, as discussed above, why not go to
zero? If an annual balanced budget is ―too strict,‖71 however, then we
certainly could not run the annual surpluses necessary to pay down the
national debt.
This would suggest that we might be able to find a level of the debt-toGDP ratio that is too high, to set an upper limit on federal borrowing. Some
recent work comparing debt levels and economic experiences crossnationally suggests that a debt-to-GDP ratio of 90% is the point at which
the average country grows more slowly. 72 Some analysts have seized upon
66

N. Gregory Mankiw, What‟s Sustainable About This Budget?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,

2010.
67

Id.
Luigi L. Pasinetti, The Myth (or Folly) of the 3% Deficit/GDP Maastricht
„Parameter‟, 22 CAMB. J. ECON. 103, 103 (1998).
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Mankiw, supra note 66.
72
Carmen Reinhart & Ken Rogoff, Growth in a Time of Debt 22 (Nat‘l Bureau of
68
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this as yet another reason to be scared about the U.S. fiscal situation,
because (by some measures) the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio could pass 90%
next year.73
This is, at least, a start in trying to understand the appropriate debt-toGDP ratio. Even so, it is the only study of its kind, comparing countries
around the world. One economist, for example, noted ―the ability . . . of
some advanced countries to manage debt burdens as high as 250 percent of
74
GDP.‖ Moreover, there is no way to know whether the causality runs
from high debt to low growth, or low growth to high debt.75
In short, there is no good answer to the question of how high the deficit
can be, either in a given year or over the long term. Rather than fighting
over whether the deficit is at the ―right‖ level, therefore, the more sensible
approach is to ask on an ongoing basis whether any particular change in the
deficit — through either changes in taxes or spending — is justified on the
basis of its contribution to the economy‘s health and to people‘s well-being.
As discussed below, there are both short-run and long-run policies that will
meet that criterion. We need to put in place a system of governance that
does not forsake those policies in the mistaken belief that the deficit simply
must be reduced.
III. GOOD DEFICITS IN THE SHORT RUN: FIGHTING RECESSIONS
Even some of the most adamant opponents of deficits concede that
there is such a thing as a ―good deficit.‖ 76 The standard theory is that
deficits are acceptable in the short run, if the economy is weak. Although
even this basic wisdom has been drowned out in the current political
atmosphere, it must be remembered that this point of view is absolutely the
standard position among macroeconomists. 77 While one can argue about

Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15,639, 2010).
73
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, The 90 Percent Debt-to-GDP
Threshold and CBO‟s New Debt Estimates, COMM. RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET BLOG (Mar.
9, 2010) (―[S]ometime this decade we will reach a point where our debt is sufficiently high
to slow growth in a significant way.‖).
74
Paul Krugman, Debt and Transfiguration, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Mar. 12,
2010), http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/03/12/debt-and-transfiguration/.
75
Id.
76
GOOD DEFICIT/BAD DEFICIT, COMM. FOR A RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Apr. 2009).
77
This is not to say that there are no voices raised in dissent against that standard
position. Some economists who generally oppose active government involvement in
economic stabilization continue to argue against the efficacy and wisdom of deficit
spending, even in the face of the worst ongoing unemployment crisis since the Great
Depression. See, e.g., Robert Barro, The Folly of Subsidizing Unemployment, WALL ST. J.,
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political aspects of deficit spending, such as whether delays of the
legislative process will cause the deficit spending to be mistimed, there is
very broad agreement that it is not only acceptable but wise to fight
economic downturns with fiscal policy — especially if monetary policy
cannot be counted on to push the economy back in the right direction.78
Because of that broad agreement, there is little need to go into
excessive detail about the mechanisms by which short-run deficits work to
improve a weak economy. This section, therefore, simply offers a brief
summary of how budget deficits work during a recession. Because the case
for long-run deficits is somewhat less well-known (though not, ultimately,
more economically controversial) the next section will discuss the case for
long-run deficits in a somewhat more painstaking fashion.
A. Weak Economies Need Help to Be Brought Back to Life
When an economy is in a recession, which has been the situation in the
United States (and most other countries) from 2008 through the date of this

Aug. 30, 2010 (professor in Harvard‘s Economics Department arguing that, ―[i]n general, the
[Obama] administration has been too focused on expanding government, redistributing more
from rich to poor, and stimulating aggregate demand‖); Michael J. Boskin, Why the
Spending Stimulus Failed, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 2010 (former chief economist to the first
President Bush, now professor in Stanford‘s Economics Department summarizing some
studies challenging the standard view of deficit spending during recessions — but favoring
tax cuts, which can also increase aggregate demand — and concluding that ―[t]hese
empirical studies leave many leading economists dubious about the ability of government
spending to boost the economy in the short run‖); Alberto Alesina & Silvia Ardagna, Large
Changes in Fiscal Policy: Taxes Versus Spending (Nat‘l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15438, 2009) (describing cross-national study of economically advanced
countries‘ uses of fiscal stimulus, claiming to find evidence that ―spending cuts adopted to
reduce deficits have been associated with economic expansions rather than recessions‖);
Alberto Alesina, Tax Cuts vs. Deficits: The Evidence Is In, WALL ST. J., Sep. 15, 2010
(―How can spending cuts be expansionary? First, they signal that tax increases will not occur
in the future, or that if they do they will be smaller.‖). But see Paul Krugman, Expansionary
Austerity?, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (Aug. 20, 2010), http://krugman.blogs.
nytimes.com/2010/08/20/expansionary-austerity/ (critiquing the arguments in Alesina and
Ardagna, and Alesina, and concluding: ―Here‘s a comprehensive list of [cases where
austerity led to growth]: Ireland 1987‖). See also Arjun Jayadev & Mike Konczal, THE
ROOSEVELT INST., THE BOOM NOT THE SLUMP: THE RIGHT TIME FOR AUSTERITY (Aug. 23,
2010), http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/all/files/not_the_time_for_austerity.pdf
(criticizing the claims in Alesina and Ardagna, concluding ―that there is little evidence
provided by [Alesina and Ardagna] that cutting the federal deficit in the short-term, under
the conditions the United States currently faces, would improve the country‘s prospects. It
may even make the United States‘ situation far worse‖).
78
See infra Part III.B.
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writing, the elements that might provide strength to an economy all begin to
move in the wrong direction, enhancing the negative effects of the recession
in a vicious cycle of decline. There is not, in other words, a reliable method
by which one can expect the economy to turn around, other than simply
waiting and hoping that the economy will hit bottom and turn around on its
own.
The four major sectors of the economy — the sources of spending that
provide businesses with their reason for being, allowing them to hire
workers — are: consumers who buy goods and services, businesses that buy
capital equipment from other businesses, governments that both consume
and invest, and foreign buyers of the nation‘s exports. The three
nongovernmental sectors, however, all have completely rational reasons
during a recession to make decisions that will make the economy as a whole
worse off.
When consumers see that the economy is weakening, they worry that
they might lose their jobs, so even the people whose consumption is not
directly reduced by having been laid off are nonetheless wise to cut back
their consumption spending. This, in turn, gives businesses reason to lay off
still more workers, since the goods or services that companies currently
offer for sale are no longer being sold. The newly laid-off workers are thus
forced to retrench, and the news that there have been yet more layoffs
makes the remaining workers even more reluctant to spend.
Because businesses see the economy weakening, furthermore, they
have no reason to invest in capital equipment, new technology, or anything
else that would allow a business to expand. There is no need for new
investment, because the existing capital stock is more than sufficient to
produce the smaller amount of output that can be sold under depressed
economic conditions.
Exports could be a lifeline for an economy, allowing a country to sell
its goods to foreigners who might still be spending. 79 If a recession affects a
large number of countries, however, there are fewer and fewer places to
find people who can buy one‘s goods. Each country that is in recession,
moreover, is motivated to try to export its way back to prosperity. Since it is
literally impossible for every country to import less and export more at the
same time, the use of the export sector to save the economy is only possible
for a few lucky countries.
Only government spending remains. If the government refuses to spend
to fight the recession, the recession will continue, and perhaps worsen.

79

See, e.g., John Murphy, Dear 44: Economic Lifeline, POLITICO, Oct. 13, 2008, http://
www.politico.com/news/stories/1008/14469.html.
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Moreover, if the government insists on increasing taxes whenever it
increases spending, any positive impact of the spending is all but
eliminated. 80 Only a direct increase in the deficit has a hope of turning the
economy around, and only then if the change in the deficit puts money into
the hands of people who are likely to spend it. 81
B. Possible Economic Damage from Reducing Deficits
In short, only government policy can swim against the tides of a weak
economy. When the government perversely cuts back spending during a
recession, of course, that only makes matters worse. Moreover, even when
the economy is not in a recession, cutting government spending can turn
things in the wrong direction.
Imagine, for example, that the U.S. government reduced its spending in
82
a year by $300 billion, or about 2% of GDP. This would reduce the size of
the economy, at least in the immediate term, because (as described above)
government spending is one of the four major categories that make up GDP.
Reductions in the government‘s spending reduce the incomes of the people
and businesses who would have received that spending in exchange for
work performed, goods delivered, and so on.
Moreover, everything now works in the opposite direction from that
described above, when the government increases spending during a
recession.83 When people and companies lose income, they in turn reduce
their spending (and, in the case of businesses, hiring), which is the classic
―multiplier effect‖ of fiscal policy — so called because a one dollar
reduction in spending by the federal government sets in a motion a chain of

80

As a technical matter, the ―balanced-budget multiplier‖ — the multiple by which
GDP increases when both spending and taxes go up by the same amount — is generally a
positive number. This means that ―pay as you go‖ rules do not entirely neuter expansionary
fiscal policies, but they drastically reduce their effectiveness.
81
Tax cuts for people whose basic needs are already being met — people, in other
words, who have relatively high incomes — are thus not particularly stimulative to the
economy. Having the government itself do the spending most directly puts money into the
economy, because doing so does not rely upon an individual‘s decision about whether to
spend the money. Businesses that sell their wares to the government, in turn, then have an
incentive to begin to hire more workers. See the discussion on the estimates of the impact of
various types of spending and tax cuts, infra note 85.
82
Three hundred billion dollars is equal to 2% of 2010‘s nearly $15 trillion GDP.
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: AN UPDATE, (Aug. 2010),
http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/117xx/doc11705/08-18-Update.pdf, at xiv Summ. Tbl. 2 (showing
forecast for GDP in 2010 of $14,804 billion).
83
See supra Part III.A.
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events that results in more than one dollar of GDP being lost to the
economy. 84 The size of the government spending multiplier continues to be
the subject of extensive empirical investigation, with one recent estimate
suggesting that a one percent increase in government spending leads to
more than a 1.5% increase in GDP about a year later, 85 and a more recent
estimate of various types of government spending showing that the
multiplier ranges from as low as 1.13 to as high as 1.74.86 If the highest
number is accurate, that would mean that a 2% reduction in government
spending would lead to a 3.5% decline in GDP. 87
To err on the side of caution, however, assume that there is no
multiplier effect at all, that is, that GDP shrinks by exactly as much as the
federal government cuts its spending in a given year, assuming (counterintuitively and counter-factually) that private actors who lose incomes
because of reduced federal spending choose not to change their behavior,
negating any possible ripple effect of cutbacks. The hypothesized 2% cut in
spending would then shrink GDP by only 2%, rather than 3.5%.88
According to a well-known empirical regularity called ―Okun‘s Law,‖ this
would lead to an increase in the unemployment rate of roughly 1%.89 If the
economy had started in a period of full-employment and broad prosperity,
with the unemployment rate at 4%, the spending cut would have put over
one million people out of work, raising the unemployment rate to 5% or

84

See N. GREGORY M ANKIW, MACROECONOMICS 262-64 (4th ed. 2000).
See Christina Romer & Jared Bernstein, The Job Impact of the American
Reinvestment and Recovery Plan, app. 1, at 12 (Jan. 9, 2009), available at
http://www.economy.com/mark-zandi/documents/The_Job_Impact_of_the_American_
Recovery_and_Reinvestment_Plan.pdf. A tax increase will have a smaller multiplier,
because taxes do not show up directly in GDP. A tax increase, therefore, will only reduce
GDP if it causes spending reductions by people or businesses. If it does, those reductions
will also spill over into further spending cuts, as those who receive lower incomes after their
employers and customers cut back on spending do likewise. If the tax increase does not
cause an initial reduction in spending, however, there will be nothing to multiply, and there
will be no reduction in GDP. See id. (showing that the tax multiplier plateaus just below a
value of 1, meaning that a 1% of GDP cut in taxes will lead to almost a 1% increase in
GDP).
86
Perspectives on the U.S. Economy Hearing Before H. Comm. on the Budget, 111th
Cong. 7 (2010) (statement of Mark Zandi, Chief Economist, Moody‘s Analytics) [hereinafter
Testimony of Mark Zandi].
87
See id.
88
See id.
89
―Okun‘s Law‖ holds, as a rough approximation, that a 1% decrease (increase) in
GDP is associated with a 2–2.5% decrease (increase) in unemployment. See M ANKIW, supra
note 84, at 36.
85
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more. 90
However, the current economic situation is unique: ―Under Okun‘s
Law, a formula for the relationship between output and unemployment
described by the 1960s-era White House economist Arthur Okun, the
jobless rate at the end of 2009 would have been around 8.3 percent instead
91
of 10 percent.‖ If the historical relationship between lost GDP and job
losses has gotten worse, then attempts to cut the deficit can impose an even
larger long-term cost on the economy and the nation‘s citizens.
The short-term costs of deficit reduction can thus be severe, especially
because they are concentrated on a small group of people rather than spread
throughout the economy. 92 The harms imposed on a small, vulnerable
group can also have long-lasting effects, because the people thus affected
can suffer losses from extended bouts of unemployment that are difficult to
reverse, if they can be reversed at all. These consequences of
unemployment include suicides and other acts of violence; 93 but they also
include the loss of skills and health that accompany being laid off from
one‘s job. 94
Of course, it is possible for monetary policy to offset some or all of this
effect, with decreases in interest rates creating economic stimulus to offset
the fiscal contraction. The ability of monetary policymakers to deal with
this problem, however, is significantly less than perfect. The larger the
fiscal contraction, the larger must be the offsetting monetary stimulus.
There is a time lag between the onset of the monetary stimulus and its
impact on the economy, with real harms continuing until the positive
impact of the decreased interest rates is felt.95 Moreover, depending upon
how low interest rates are at the beginning of the process, monetary
policymakers might well reach the limit of their ability to offset the fiscal
decline. During the 2008-2009 period, for example, interest rates were
90

See Testimony of Mark Zandi, supra note 86, at 7.
John Harwood, Mystery for White House: Where Did the Jobs Go?, THE CAUCUS
(Jul. 19, 2010), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/19/mystery-for-white-housewhere-did-the-jobs-go/?scp=1&sq=%22welcome%20as%20it%20is%22&st=cse.
92
A 1% across-the-board decline in income would hurt everyone a little bit, whereas a
100% decline in income for 1% of the work force would hurt over one million people
severely.
93
T.A. Blakely, S.C.D. Collings & J. Atkinson, Unemployment and Suicide. Evidence
for a Causal Association?, 57 J. EPIDEMIOL COMMUNITY HEALTH 594, 594 (2003) (finding
that ―[b]eing unemployed was associated with a twofold to threefold increased relative risk
of death by suicide, compared with being employed‖).
94
See Claudia Rowe, Those Who‟ve Lost Careers Face Deep Psychological Stress,
THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 20, 2010.
95
ANDREW B. ABEL & BEN S. BERNANKE, MACROECONOMICS 541-42 (5th ed. 2005).
91
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already so low that there was virtually no room to engage in traditional
interest rate cuts to fight the ever-deepening recession.96
The point here is not to discuss all of the nuances of fiscal and
monetary policy options — issues well beyond the focus of this paper —
but to note that there are very serious consequences of fiscal cutbacks. In
addition to the indirect effects discussed above, it must also be remembered
that cuts in government spending result in people losing the benefit of
97
whatever spending has been cut. If a person was receiving governmentprovided job training, for example, then a budget cut to eliminate spending
on that program will not only harm the economy by putting the job
counselors into the ranks of the unemployed, but the beneficiary of that
training will also be worse off.98 When a state government loses a federal
grant to cover school costs, teachers are laid off, and children are forced
99
into larger classes with less contact with the teachers who remain.
Moreover, if the cutback takes the form of reducing federal spending on
long-term investments (such as education), the consequences will be much
100
more long-lasting.
In short, discussions of ―fiscal responsibility‖ are incomplete if they
focus only on the reductions in the deficit that accompany spending cuts.
Cutting spending also means reducing someone‘s income, and while some
101
cuts can be ―no-brainers‖ because they eliminate pure waste,
the
persistence of many spending programs is at least partly explained by the
fact that such programs provide value to someone. Even when a program

96

It is true that the Fed has engaged in some nontraditional methods to stimulate the
economy even when its target interest rate had been reduced to near zero, but those creative
methods were also quite controversial.
97
See, e.g., Cuts Hurt NY Environment Department, Officials Say, CBS N.Y., Nov. 18,
2010, http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2010/11/18/cuts-hurt-ny-environment-department
officials-say/ (explaining how budget and staffing cuts keep the New York Department of
Environmental Conservation from performing its job); see also Lisa Singleton-Rickman,
School Funding: What‟s Next?, TIMES DAILY, Nov. 25, 2010, http://www.timesdaily.com/
article/20101125/news/101129871?Title=School-funding-What-s-next.
98
See Singleton-Rickman, supra note 97 (discussing the effects of cutting government
spending on education, ―I‘m afraid it will be larger classes and teachers losing out on
professional development — the kind of things that have helped make our system strong‖).
99
See id.
100
See infra Part IV (regarding the difference between government consumption and
government investment).
101
See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Lobbying Imperils Overhaul of Student Loans, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 4, 2010 (discussing the 2010 change in the federal student loan program, which ended
the subsidy program that gave money to lenders to make loans that were risk-free, because
they were guaranteed by the federal government).
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does not do so, however, there is at least a short-term loss to the economy
for virtually every cut in spending, because the spending cuts result in
people losing their jobs. That affects not just the laid off workers, but their
families and communities, and the broader economy as well.
C. Deficits Use Resources That Would Otherwise Lie Idle
As described earlier in this article, the most important and plausible
harm from running deficits is ―crowding out,‖ which is the process by
which the government‘s deficit claims resources that might have been used
by private businesses to expand their productive capacity. 102 If the economy
is operating below capacity, however, there is a temporary free lunch, in
that the government can hire workers and machines that would otherwise
remain idle. 103
Because of this, the private sector is not disadvantaged by the
government‘s additional involvement in the economy, and indeed the new
government workers are enabled to buy items from private companies that
they otherwise would not have been able to afford. This can encourage
private firms to increase spending on productive plant and equipment,
creating a virtuous cycle that can help to end the downturn. The process by
which government spending can increase private investment is known as
―Crowding In.‖104
Since there is no tradeoff between government and private spending
during a downturn, therefore, crowding out is only a relevant concern
105
during periods of prosperity.
D. The Increase in Overall Debt During Recessions is Sustainable
The final aspect of running deficits in the short run is whether —
notwithstanding all of the other benefits that deficits have in mitigating
recessions — the resulting increases in the national debt are a matter of
concern. The short answer is that they are not. As noted above, there is wide
agreement that a constant ratio of national debt to GDP represents a

102

See supra Part II.
See Benjamin M. Friedman, Crowding Out or Crowding In? Economic
Consequences of Financing Government Deficits, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY
593, 596–97 (1978).
104
See id.; Neil H. Buchanan, The Effects of the Fiscal Deficit on the Composition of
U.S. GDP: An Analysis of Disaggregated Data, in IMPROVING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 133
(Paul Davidson & Jan A. Kregel eds., 1997).
105
See Friedman, supra note 103.
103
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sustainable and fiscally responsible situation. 106 Short-run deficits, by
definition, increase national debt by a finite amount. If it takes, say, an
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio of 10% to end a recession, the debt after
the recession is over will not continue to rise (at least, not because of antirecessionary spending).
Moreover, a healthy economy will return to a higher level of GDP, thus
lowering the debt-to-GDP ratio below where it would have been had the
economy continued to languish. In addition, because GDP grows annually
in a healthy economy, any increase in the overall debt due to antirecessionary spending will shrink as a percentage of GDP, as the economy
107
grows in the future.
In sum, an ailing economy needs ―good deficits‖ in the form of higher
government spending. Failing to provide such stimulus needlessly extends
the misery of a recession, and it does nothing to improve the long-term
health of the economy.
IV. GOOD DEFICITS IN THE LONG RUN: ENHANCING GROWTH
An essential responsibility of conscientious governance is to determine
the likely effects of our current spending decisions on future well-being.
The most important of these long-term effects, however, are not to be found
in measurements of budget deficits but rather in the nature of the spending
projects that we undertake. Some government projects help only people
living today, others will provide benefits only to people in the future, and
still others will be a boon to the present and the future alike. For legal and
policy analysts, therefore, the most important issue in assessing any
government policy is not whether it increases the deficit, but whether the
policy is in a meaningful sense ―worth it.‖108
The concept of public investment is not difficult to understand. The
wisest way to spend money is not necessarily to spend as little as possible.
The question of what the government buys is just as important as how much
106

See supra Part II.
MINDY R. LEVIT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE FEDERAL DEBT : AN ANALYSIS OF
MOVEMENTS FROM WORLD WAR II TO THE PRESENT, 13 n.36 (Sept. 17, 2010) (―In the 1990s,
debt held by the public as a percentage of GDP declined during deficit years because GDP
grew faster than the debt itself thereby decreasing the ratio. Because of this, declines in the
debt-to-GDP ratio are more common historically than budget surpluses.‖).
108
Joe Minarik, Good Debt, Bad Debt, HUFFINGTON POST, July 29, 2010, http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/joe-minarik/good-debt-and-bad-debt_b_664046.html (concluding
that public investment should be paid for up-front, but noting that certain types of
investments are more productive than others, ―Public investment is essential. . . . Public debt
can be a necessary evil.‖).
107
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it buys, or whether to run a deficit. Cutting spending on productive
investments in the name of fiscal responsibility is simply unwise. As one
analyst argued early in the 2008 presidential election season: ―For all their
recent talk about wasteful spending, none of the Republican [presidential]
hopefuls have offered specifics about what they would ax. But in the past,
their targets have been programs that foster better health, education and
infrastructure. Those are precisely the investments we need for economic
vitality.‖109 Indeed, the Bush administration — which at least claimed to
disapprove of government spending programs — was willing to spend
money on projects that would enhance future prosperity. 110
Moreover, the government‘s budget itself — not just general economic
prosperity — is often harmed by short-term thinking that treats budget cuts
as inherently good, even when such cuts are especially foolish:
Preventing cancer, or treating it early, is a lot less expensive than
treating advanced cancer. So what did this president do? He
proposed a cut in the program of $1.4 million . . ., which would
mean that 4,000 fewer women would have access to early
detection. This makes no sense. In human terms, it is cruel. From a
budget standpoint, it‘s self-defeating . . . ―It won‘t save money. . . .
You don‘t save money by not diagnosing cancer early. You end up
spending more money because anyone who develops cancer will
get into the health care system and they will be treated. And the
cost at that point will be a lot more. The logic here is very simple:
the later you diagnose cancer of the breast or cervix, the more
expensive it is to the country.‖ 111
The case for running deficits in the long run, or when the economy is
not in a recession, is not as simple as the case for stimulus spending. Even
so, there is ultimately very little disagreement among economists that it is
possible to have the government improve the economy by investing in
112
capital that will improve living standards in the long run. The concept
109

Editorial, Deficit Demagogues, N.Y.TIMES, Mar. 21, 2006, at A16.
Elisabeth Bumiller & Adam Nagourney, Bush, Resetting Agenda, Says U.S. Must
Cut Reliance on Oil; Funds for Science, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A1 (―[In his 2006 State
of the Union address, President Bush] proposed a substantial increase in financing for basic
science research, called for training 70,000 new high school Advanced Placement teachers
and recruiting 30,000 math and science professionals into the nation‘s classrooms.‖).
111
Bob Herbert, Illogical Cutbacks on Cancer, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2006, at A23
(quoting Dr. Harold Freeman, a physician specializing in the prevention and treatment of
cancer).
112
Marco Bassetto with Thomas J. Sargent, Politics and Efficiency of Separating
110
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has been well known to economists for decades, 113 and it has been
implemented in other countries at various times, as well as by many U.S.
state governments.114 The problem, as discussed below, is not with the
concept but with the politics. First, however, it is useful to describe how a
government can run deficits into the indefinite future in a way that enhances
the well-being of its current and future citizens.
A. The Tradeoff Between Government and Business Spending: Theory
If the government buys or produces goods and services (when the
economy is not in a recession), it will displace some kinds of private
activity. 115 An essential question for policy makers (though hardly the only
question) is whether swapping private spending for public spending will
increase or decrease living standards in the future.
Answering that question requires two steps. First, we need to know
whether the government spending and the private spending that are being
traded off would be used to purchase investment goods, like factories and
machinery that will last a long time and can be used to increase future
productivity, or consumption goods, which have no long-term benefit.
Second, if both entities would invest rather than consume, we must compare
the payoffs of the respective investments.
Consider the first part of that analysis. If the government would spend
its money on investment goods, while the private spending would have
been used to purchase consumption goods, the situation is simple: the
government‘s spending will surely increase future living standards, relative
to what they would have been if the money had been spent on private
consumption. Similarly, if the choice is between private investment and
public consumption, future growth obviously will be higher if the spending
is done by private entities. Imagine, for example, that the government were
to throw a large party by hiring people who would otherwise be working as
computer programmers and construction workers. In that case, the future
productive capacity of the economy would be reduced.116
Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets, 121 Q. J. OF ECON. 1167 (Nov. 2006) (showing
an increase in economic efficiency when the government finances investments with
increases in public debt).
113
Id. at 1169 (―John Maynard Keynes long . . . advocated the rule.‖).
114
Id. at 1167.
115
See Friedman, supra note 103, at 635 (―Under either transactions crowding out or
portfolio crowding out, income increases because each dollar of government spending
replaces a smaller, though still strictly positive, amount of private investment.‖).
116
If the government throws its party by hiring the people who would have worked at a
privately-funded party, then future production is unaffected.
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The interesting situation is the second part of the analysis, where both
the government and the private sector would spend money on productive
investments. In that situation, long-term growth is maximized when the
money is spent on the investment project that has a higher payoff, i.e. a
higher rate of return. If the government has on tap a project that could
return 10% annually on investment, while a private firm wishes to finance a
project that could pay 5%, then the government‘s spending is a better way
to raise the living standards of future generations.
Determining the expected rate of return on investment projects is, of
course, anything but an exact science, as discussed at some length in the
next section. As a very rough proxy, however, we can assume that private
firms have conducted their own financial analyses and will engage in
investment projects that pay a higher rate of return than the cost of
borrowing for the firm. If a firm can borrow at 3% and invest at 5%, that is
a profitable proposition. Firms are thus believed to forgo those projects with
low rates of return, relative to the interest rates at which they borrow.
The returns on potential government investments are not as easy to
determine. 117 If we had perfect information, we could simply maximize the
output available to future generations by allowing the government to
engage in investment projects with rates of return that exceed market
interest rates. If our goal is to maximize future growth, the ideal stance for
the government is thus not to reduce spending to the lowest possible level
but to spend only on projects that have rates of return that exceed the
118
interest rate for private borrowing.

117

See generally Kenneth J. Arrow & Robert C. Lind, Uncertainty and the Evaluation
of Public Investment Decisions, 60 AM. ECON. REV. 364, 364–78 (1970) (discussing options
for determining which public investments to undertake given the uncertainty of returns on
investment).
118
This, however, still leaves open the question of why we must maximize the capital
stock that we pass on to our heirs. Given that economic growth is generally on an upward
trend, why is it necessary to give our wealthy grandchildren even greater wealth? The broad
(within the economics profession as well as among politicians) silence on this question is
notable, to say the least. The unspoken assumption is quite blunt: we must not do anything to
reduce the capital stock that we bequeath to our children and grandchildren. Perhaps it is
time to question that assumption more aggressively. See Neil H. Buchanan, What Do We
Owe Future Generations?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1237, 1250-57 (2009). (Moreover,
although the subject for a different article, it is equally important to account for the
―intergenerational unfairness‖ created by problems such as environmental damage.)
Notwithstanding that concern, the present analysis adopts the conventional approach in
attempting to maximize future growth for the benefit of future people.
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B. Capital Budgeting, Growth Budgeting, and Future Well-Being
The fundamental accounting concept of ―capital budgeting‖ separates
government expenditures into two categories: purchases of goods and
services for current consumption that provide no long-term payoff
(―operating expenditures‖), and purchases of productive capital goods that
119
do generate long-term payoffs (―capital expenditures‖).
The capital
budget thus accounts for items whose benefits are longer-lasting and can be
expected to produce economic activity and growth in the future that is
greater than would otherwise happen.120 One rough estimate of the fraction
of federal spending that can be categorized as capital expenditures is
121
122
25%. With federal spending at $3 trillion in fiscal 2009,
that rough
guide would mean that $750 billion of that year‘s spending by the federal
government went toward items that are likely to pay for themselves over the
123
long run.
It is also possible, as discussed below, to expand the range of possible
public investments that would count as capital expenditures to include those
that do not produce physical infrastructure but that nevertheless provide
long-term economic benefits. Adding these items — such as spending on
basic research, health care, nutrition, etc. — to the more narrowly defined
capital budget, I use the term ―growth budgeting‖ to describe a modified
capital budgeting system through which the government can identify
available long-term investments that could benefit posterity.
Capital budgeting as an accounting concept is so fundamental that it
must be as old as accounting itself. Any sensible decision maker would
want to know whether spending is being undertaken for immediate
gratification or for long-term benefit. By accounting convention, publicly
held corporations must separate operating and capital expenditures. Indeed,
most ―profitable‖ corporations would not be viewed as such if they were
prevented from segregating their capital expenditures from their operating
expenditures, since even the most profitable corporations borrow money

119

JACK RABIN, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND PUBLIC POLICY, 155
(Merker Dekker, Inc. 2003).
120
Many capital projects are likely to bring with them the requirement of at least a
minimal level of maintenance expenditures. Depreciation of the existing capital stock and
maintenance expenditures are thus netted out of the capital account.
121
See Buchanan, Debt, Deficits, and Fiscal, supra note 23.
122
Congressional Budget Office, CBO‟s Baseline Budget Projections (Apr. 4, 2008),
http://cbo.gov/ftpdocs/90xx/doc9015/Selected_Tables.pdf.
123
See id.
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every year (that is, they run ―deficits‖). 124 Similarly, the vast majority of
state and local governments use capital budgeting. 125 The requirement that
most U.S. state governments balance their budgets is, indeed, not what it
might seem, because a state can still borrow money for capital spending
even if it does not have the tax revenue to pay for the capital items in the
year in which they are purchased. 126
Almost all large organizations in the world, including governments,
have adopted some form of a capital budget, with the U.S. federal
government standing out for its failure to adopt (and to be disciplined by) a
capital accounting system. 127 It is odd, therefore, that the federal
government would not use capital budgeting. This failure has led to a great
deal of consternation among budget analysts, concern that becomes
especially pronounced when assessing the federal government‘s options in
the face of large-scale crises such as the damage due to Hurricanes Katrina
and Rita on the Gulf Coast in 2005, the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in
2010, and more generally the government‘s failure to invest systematically
128
in future productivity.
124

Mark Mizruchi & Linda Stearns, A Longitudinal Study of Borrowing By Large
American Corporations, 39 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 118, 138 (1994) (―Many of a firm‘s most critical
decisions, including plant expansion, development of new technologies, entering new
product lines, and acquisitions of other firms, require the use of external financing. . . . All
corporations borrow money.‖).
125
RABIN, supra note 119, at 155 (―Eighty-four percent of state governments separate
capital expenditures from operating expenditures, 40% of counties separate capital
expenditures from operating expenditures, and 71% of cities separate capital expenditures
from operating expenditures.‖).
126
See id. (―State and local governments use capital budgets because it improves
decision efficiency since capital assets can be financed either by revenue raised currently
(taxes, charges, grants, etc.) or by borrowing on the promise to repay from future revenues.
If operating and capital expenditures are combined, capital assets appear more expensive
relative to operating expenditures, even though they will be used over a number of years.
Capital budgets are financed, but not necessarily balanced; operating budgets are
balanced.‖).
127
Id. (―The federal government does not have a full-scale capital budgeting process.
Funding for most federal capital assets is provided in annual appropriations under
discretionary caps.‖).
128
Sherle R. Schwenninger, A Capital Budget for Public Investment, NEW AM., 61,
available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/NAF_10big_Ideas_10.pdf (―Indeed, the
federal budget does not even officially distinguish between spending on productivityenhancing investment and spending on current consumption. As a result, the federal
government currently does not adequately fund investment in our nation‘s physical
infrastructure of knowledge capital upon which a more productive economy rests.‖); see also
Michael Moynihan, Investing in Our Common Future: U.S. Infrastructure, NDN, Nov. 13,
2007, http://ndn.org/paper/2007/us-infrastructure.
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After natural disasters strike, policy makers are generally quick to
respond to calls for rebuilding, knowing that this type of spending is quite
different from other types of government spending projects, yet they are
also mindful that such rebuilding projects can themselves veer from being
necessary and productive spending into becoming opportunities for
wasteful and even corruption-riddled spending. What is missing is a
mechanism by which we could ensure that a capital account would not
present too great a temptation for political actors, who — it seems likely —
would attempt to move many dubious items from the operating budget onto
the capital budget, thus obscuring the wasteful nature of some government
spending during such rebuilding efforts.129
More deeply, the concern is that it might not be possible to identify a
principled approach to capital budgeting that would reliably separate true
investments from the remainder of government spending. The general
problem, therefore, is in determining the relative costs and benefits of
various potential government spending programs. Unfortunately, ―[i]n the
world of infrastructure, cost-benefit analysis is still a science of the
future.‖130 Any attempt to draw lines, even in a world without crass
political opportunism, could thus fail to achieve the goal of identifying
those spending projects — and only those spending projects — that
contribute to the long-run growth of the U.S. economy and that therefore
can be financed through deficit spending without compromising the longterm prosperity of the American people. 131
The arguments against having the federal government adopt capital
budgeting are thus ultimately prudential, based on the belief that it is simply
unwise to trust Congress with such a powerful tool for justifying deficit
spending. 132 With a capital budget available, the argument goes, any silly
129

See Moynihan, supra note 128 (―A National Infrastructure Bank would give public
authorities means to capitalize federal investment in new infrastructure projects. It would
also create a new center of knowledge and expertise on infrastructure with the ability to
intermediate between the public and investors. On the other hand, concentrating
responsibility for federal infrastructure finance in a bank might reduce the flexibility of some
agencies (and the authority of some congressional committee chairmen).‖).
130
David Leonhardt, A Stimulus With Merit, And Misses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2009,
at B1.
131
June E. O‘Neill, Dir. Cong. Budget Office, on Capital Budgeting Before the
President‟s Commission to Study Capital Budgeting (April 24, 1998), http://www.
cbo.gov/doc.cfm?index=440&type=0 [hereinafter 1998 CBO Study] (―Substituting annual
depreciation for full acquisition cost in the budget, therefore, would displace an objective
measure with a subjective one, whose imprecise character would make it a convenient target
for manipulation and distortion.‖).
132
See id.
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expenditure can be slipped into the federal budget and camouflaged as
capital spending. The entire process, this argument continues, would be
open to abuse and gamesmanship.133 Indeed, former President Clinton drew
fire from the nation‘s English teachers (who, it must be noted, are not
typically a force in national politics) when he attempted to describe some
spending policies as ―investments,‖ taking third place in the 1993
Doublespeak Awards because of his use of ―the word ‗investment‘ as a
substitute for the word ‗spending‘ in his rhetoric on economic policy.‖134
While it is certainly possible to over-use the word ―investment,‖ the
English teachers simply had their accounting wrong. The choice is not
between spending and investment, but between investment spending and
consumption spending. If we view government as having to choose between
the two, then our goal should not be to prevent politicians from using the
term ―investment,‖ but rather to ensure that they use it correctly.
This is an especially apt example of the aphorism that we should not let
the perfect be the enemy of the good. That is, we should not allow the
difficulties of creating a complete system that could flawlessly classify
every investment project on the capital account (and all other projects on
the operating account) to prevent us from identifying the relatively easy
cases where a spending project is almost certainly an investment in future
prosperity. Because perfection is impossible, any type of real-world capital
accounting system should certainly have as a default position that any
spending project is presumptively on the operating account. Yet there
should be a mechanism to allow items to be moved onto a capital account.
As discussed below, that mechanism could include simple legislative action
on an item-by-item basis, or it could involve the harnessing of technical
expertise through either an independent agency (for example, a budget
agency modeled along the lines of the Federal Reserve) or through quasi135
judicial decision-making in an adversarial process.
C. Capital Budgeting, the Golden Rule, and Growth Budgeting
Because it is so difficult to determine whether expenditures will have
long-term payoffs to the economy, it is a common short-hand to view
government purchases of physical items (buildings, roads, etc.) as
investments (and thus on the capital account) and its other purchases as
133

See, e.g., Karen Pennar, Beware of Accounting Magic Tricks, Mr. Clinton, BUS.
WK., Jan. 18, 1993, at 55.
134
Jan Ackerman, Forked Tongues Prevail on High; Pentagon Gets Annual
Doublespeak Award from Teachers Group, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1993, at B-1.
135
See infra Part III.B.
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consumption (and thus operating expenditures). 136 While the logic of this is
appealing, it omits some of the most important items on which the
government spends money.
For example, when the government funds basic research, it does not
buy a physical item but wishes to buy something that will provide longterm returns to the economy. Spending on all levels of education, on
medical care, and on nutrition programs all offer the promise of long-term
137
payoffs that could exceed borrowing costs.
The key is not to maximize the purchase of physical infrastructure but
to choose the physical and intangible investments that will provide the
greatest benefit to future citizens. This goes beyond simply arguing in favor
of adopting a system of capital budgeting. It also suggests that even
balancing an operating budget is not sufficient.
Balancing the operating account while borrowing to finance items on
the capital account, sometimes called the Golden Rule of Budgeting,138
actually allows the government to waste resources if it is able to raise the
taxes to do so. This should be unacceptable, because it would represent a
direct transfer from the politically voiceless to those who benefit from the
wasteful spending. Instead, the government‘s decisions should always
include considerations of whether those decisions are helpful to the current
and future health of the economy.
Because of the common tendency to refer only to physical capital when
discussing capital budgeting, I have coined the term ―growth budgeting‖ to
make clear that the purpose is to choose those expenditures that will
increase future growth, not to spend money on ―capital‖ only in its narrower
physical meaning.
D. Some Examples: Investing in Children
A good example of the kind of analysis that should be brought into a
136

In the U.S. federal government‘s National Income and Product Accounts,
government spending is divided into consumption expenditures and gross investment. See
Bruce E. Baker & Pamela A. Kelly, A Primer on BEA‟s Government Accounts, SURV. OF
CURRENT BUS., Mar. 2008, at 32 (―Gross investment is the value of investment in structures,
equipment, and software.‖).
137
Indeed, even short of these intangible items, a decision rule that simply puts the
label of ―capital investment‖ on anything made with concrete can impoverish the future. ―[A
sensible spending plan would] help cover the budget shortfalls of public transit systems,
instead of simply allocating another $30 billion for the construction of new highways.‖
Leonhardt, supra note 130.
138
See also Bassetto, supra note 112; cf. Malcolm Sawyer, On Budget Deficits and
Capital Expenditures 3 (The Jerome Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 208, 1997).
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Growth Budgeting regime concerns expenditures on early childhood
education programs. A number of careful studies have been undertaken
over the last several decades to determine whether spending on the
education of very young children pays dividends to society.139 The theory is
that catching children (especially at-risk children) early and giving them
extensive help in learning how to learn will increase the likelihood of
success throughout their lives, reducing the costs of special education,
prisons, etc.140
The question is whether those investments actually pay off, and by how
much. An assessment of several such studies shows that estimated rates of
return on investments in early childhood education are extremely high, with
estimated benefit/cost ratios (in present value terms) ranging from 2.36 in
one study to 17.1 in another.141 Because a ratio of 1.0 implies that (properly
measured) costs equal (properly measured) benefits, a ratio of 2.36 means
that every dollar spent results in $2.36 of benefits, while a ratio of 17.1
means that every dollar spent results in $17.10 in benefits. 142 Passing up
these future benefits in the name of safeguarding the future (through deficit
reduction) is nonsensical.
Other researchers have found equally promising results for investments
in young children. For example, a summary of studies by two economists
showed that ―[o]n productivity grounds alone, it appears to make sound
business sense to invest in young children from disadvantaged
environments. An accumulating body of evidence suggests that early
childhood interventions are much more effective than remedies that attempt
to compensate for early neglect later in life.‖ 143
Similarly, recent research has shown that, even after children enter the
139

See e.g., JIM SAXTON, JOINT ECON. COMM., INVESTMENT IN EDUCATION : PRIVATE
PUBLIC RETURNS (2010), http://www.house.gov/jec/educ.htm (concluding that
investment in education provides enormous social and economic benefit and noting ―[t]here
is a strong consensus among economists that formal education is an important determinant of
individual earnings as well as economic growth‖).
140
Julia B. Isaacs, Cost-Effective Investments in Children, in BUDGETING FOR
NATIONAL PRIORITIES 1, 4 (The Brookings Institution ed., 2007) (―A large research literature
has documented many positive effects of preschool programs, including greater school
readiness and higher educational attainment, as well as reduced criminal activity and
increased employment as an adolescent and adult.‖).
141
Id. at 6 tbl.2.
142
See id.
143
James J. Heckman & Dimitriy V. Masterov, The Productivity Argument for
Investing in Young Children, 1 (Invest in Kids Working Grp., Comm. for Econ. Dev.,
Working Paper No. 5, 2004), available at http://www.ced.org/images/library/reports/
education/early_education/ivk/summary_heckman.pdf.
AND
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school system, the benefits of their earliest experiences show up later in
life:
Students who had learned much more in kindergarten were more
likely to go to college than students with otherwise similar
backgrounds. Students who learned more were also less likely to
become single parents. As adults, they were more likely to be
saving for retirement. Perhaps most striking, they were earning
more. 144
The results showed that ―a standout kindergarten teacher is worth about
$320,000 a year. That‘s the present value of the additional money that a full
145
class of students can expect to earn over their careers.‖ Moreover, this
analysis focuses only on the economic returns to education, meaning that it
does not ―take into account social gains, like better health and less
crime.‖146
In short, by using existing techniques, it is possible to determine the
long-term payoff from at least some public spending. In the case of early
childhood education, the returns vastly exceed the costs, making such
spending a good investment in future wealth (to say nothing of the human
impact of better educational outcomes). The question is how to use that
information in a way that can improve the budgeting process, without
opening up the budget to abuse.
E. The Advantages of Piecemeal Decision-Making
The standard analysis of capital budgeting, as in the Golden Rule
approach noted above, involves an assessment of the entire government
budget‘s effect on economic growth.147 We assess whether the
government‘s investment spending will pay net dividends, and we are thus
able to say whether aggregate public investment is above or below the
optimal level. As a theoretical exercise, this approach is sensible, but for
actual policy making, this approach biases decisions against public
spending by tying the fate of clearly advantageous investments to our
ability to determine the payoffs of all other possible investments. Since that
has never been accomplished, the exercise might wrongly be abandoned in

144

David Leonhardt, The Case for $320,000 Kindergarten Teachers, N.Y. TIMES,
July 27, 2010.
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
See supra Part IV.
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the belief that the information required to make any smart investments is
unavailable.
We can avoid this tendency by changing the focus of analysis from
whether we are spending the optimal total amount on public investments to
whether any particular project has long-term payoffs. Given that we know,
for example, that early childhood education programs have a high rate of
return, there is no reason to hold spending on such a sure winner hostage to
our limited knowledge about other budget items. Such a piecemeal
approach thus allows us to move items onto the Growth Budget on a caseby-case basis, leaving some potentially valuable projects unfunded, but at
least including in the Growth Budget those projects about which we have
reason to feel especially confident. Being wrong or uncertain about one
policy need not cause us to be wrong when estimating the effects of other
policies.
V. FISCAL DISCIPLINE THROUGH AGENCY ACTION
Given the great promise of a Growth Budget, it is necessary to consider
the possible ways in which such a new approach to federal budget
accounting could go awry. Perhaps the most obvious problem, as noted
above, is the temptation for politicians to move unworthy items onto the
Growth Budget for reasons having nothing to do with the merits of the
projects at hand. Any system that implicitly makes some projects less
expensive than others — by allowing them to be financed through
borrowing rather than taxing — invites predictable abuses of the political
process, fed by lobbying, localized interests, and so on. 148
The ultimate goal of this exercise is to allow the federal government to
proceed to make at least some of the easier calls in its spending decisions,
without continually being stymied by the impossibility of creating an ideal
accounting system. Before turning to that concern, however, it is important
to acknowledge some possible objections to this proposal that are beyond
the framework of the present analysis.
A. Rejecting the Growth Budget Out of Hand
As a theoretical matter, the general notion of capital budgeting (and the
specific proposal here for adopting a Growth Budget) might seem almost
too simple. It is, after all, nothing more than an applied version of costbenefit analysis. As such, it is subject to the same concerns that apply to all
cost-benefit analyses, including whether we have taken all costs and
148

See 1998 CBO Study, supra note 131 and accompanying text.
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benefits into account, the quality of our data, and the framework for turning
those data into estimated payoffs. Still, it might appear that one could not
reasonably oppose the adoption of a Growth Budget from a theoretical
standpoint, leaving open for discussion only what to include in a Growth
Budget and how to determine what will be included in that budget.
There are, however, three possible reasons that one could reject out of
hand the need to consider adopting any kind of capital budgeting. First, one
could believe as an empirical matter that there are simply no examples of
any kind of government spending that has long-term payoffs. While this is
logically the same thing as saying that an item-by-item analysis will result
in no projects being added to the Growth Budget, one might start from the
position that there is a nonrebuttable presumption that government spending
is always inferior to private spending.
Second, one could believe that some proposed government programs
might indeed offer long-term payoffs but that those financial benefits are
offset by the very fact that funding such programs would cause the
government to grow and intrude further into people‘s lives. 149 In short, the
cost of public investment is always greater than the benefit of public
investment because the growth of government is simply too much of a
threat to personal freedom.
The third objection that one might raise to abandoning the current
system and adopting the Growth Budget is that the risks and costs of such a
150
new accounting system are simply too high.
Even if there are some
projects that could be funded without abusing personal freedoms and with
high promised returns, the costs and risks of switching to a new and
untested system make it not worth the experiment. The creation of any new
federal agencies and procedures might well impose long-term costs on
society that would overwhelm any projected gains from projects on the
Growth Budget.
The analysis in this article does not directly engage with these three
objections. The presumptions here are that there might be some spending
projects that only the government can or will undertake, that those projects
might be superior in terms of creating economic growth than the private
spending (if any) that they indirectly replace, that there is nothing unique to
149

See Minarik, supra note 108 (―There is no ‗good‘ public debt.‖).
See 1998 CBO Study, supra note 131 (―The threat to budgetary control from adding
an ambiguous budgetary category, labeled capital, increases with the need to measure
depreciation for the various forms of federal capital expenditure. Depreciation schedules
cannot avoid being arbitrary. Examples abound of investments with significant residual
value after complete depreciation, and of others that have a positive book value but have
become worthless because of technological or economic change.‖).
150
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such government programs that makes them a threat to freedom or
democracy, and that the administrative costs of adopting and running the
Growth Budget are presumptively smaller than the net returns on the
projects that would otherwise not be financed. All but one of those
presumptions is ultimately subject to empirical verification, which is either
implicit in the analysis here (such as the identification of early childhood
education programs as high-payoff spending projects) or is beyond the
scope of the present article. The untestable presumption, regarding the
dangers of what is usually called Big Government, is a matter of political
philosophy that is also outside the scope of this analysis.
In short, the analysis in this paper proceeds by setting aside potentially
valid objections to the very idea of starting down the road to separating
government spending into consumption and investment. Even for those who
are willing to set aside those objections, however, several serious obstacles
remain before one can confidently believe that the Growth Budget would
improve our long-term economic prospects.
B. Using and Abusing Capital Accounts
The primitive nature of current budget practices is, to anyone with even
a rudimentary knowledge of accounting principles, unsettling.
In the current system, the federal government sends money to
states without any real effort to evaluate whether it will pay for
worthy projects. States rarely do serious analyses of their own.
They build new roads before fixing old ones. They don‘t consider
whether those new roads will lead to faster traffic or simply more
traffic. They spend millions of dollars on legislators‘ pet projects
151
and hulking new sports stadiums.
At best, we are inching toward a system with a few small attempts to bring
rigor to the budgeting process. ―At least one version of the [2009 stimulus]
bill also sets aside $5.5 billion to be awarded by the transportation
secretary, supposedly on the merits of a project.‖152
The existing system, therefore, is ripe for improvement through the
adoption of even the most minimally competent budgeting procedures. The
legitimate concern, however, is that we can go too far in the other direction,
by creating an opportunity to move spending into the Growth Budget
without any reasonable checks on how that is done. While it hardly
151
152

Leonhardt, supra note 130.
Id.
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stretches the imagination to suspect that members of Congress do not
always act in accordance with pure economic theory, it is simply not true
that a capital budgeting process must automatically be an open cookie jar.
Accounting standards have existed for decades and have been adapted to
various types of government activities.153 Government and private entities
do, of course, sometimes play at the edges of these rules, but the very fact
that accounting-related mismanagement comes to light and is treated as a
problem arises from the presumption that those rules are otherwise
generally being followed. Even if enforcement is imperfect, there is no
reason to presume that the system must necessarily be open to rampant
abuse. Even an irregularly enforced speed limit will generally result in
slower traffic than no speed limit at all.
Moreover, the current federal system effectively treats all expenditures
154
as if they were operating expenses. While it is possible to adopt a capital
or growth budget and then to implement it incorrectly, not to implement it
guarantees that the government‘s budget is measured incorrectly.155 It also
leads to poor policy choices. If the only goal is to balance the budget,
cutting projects with valuable long-term payoffs looks just as good as
cutting purely wasteful spending. It even becomes ―desirable‖ to sell public
assets at a loss, since any revenues proceeding from those sales reduce the
annual deficit.
Separating government spending into investment and consumption,
therefore, has at least two desirable effects. First, it would prevent
policymakers from cutting programs that are likely to provide long-term
benefits to the economy. For example, to prove their fiscal responsibility,
the leadership of the House of Representatives several years ago wanted to
cut funding for mass transit, because they ―see transportation projects as
one of the first ways to cut back the budget and reduce the deficit.‖156
While it is plausible that some mass transit projects would not provide
long-term payoffs, others surely would. For present purposes, the assertion
is simply that there are likely to be some projects that would qualify for the

153

See generally Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, FED. ACCT. STANDARDS
ADVISORY BD., http://www.fasab.gov/accepted.html (discussing accounting procedures for
the U.S. federal government); GOV‘T ACCT. STANDARDS BD., http://www.gasb.org/
(discussing accounting procedures for the U.S. state and local governments).
154
See RABIN, supra note 119, at 155.
155
See generally Moynihan, supra note 128 (advocating the creation of a National
Infrastructure Bank that would allow public authorities to capitalize federal investment in
new infrastructure projects).
156
Raymond Hernandez, Senate Panel Backs Transit Aid for New York, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 5, 2004, at B7.
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Growth Budget, and it would thus be wise to identify them and to pay for
them, even from borrowed funds. At the very least, it remains to be proven
that the political gamesmanship that would exist under a system of capital
budgeting would necessarily be worse for the economy than our current
system.
The second advantage of adopting a capital budget for the federal
government is that it would penetrate the category commonly known as
―pork-barrel‖ spending. The operative definition currently seems to be that
pork is anything that directly benefits a specific legislator‘s constituents:
―Relatively little of the extra spending [in a 2007 supplemental budget
request] is targeted to lawmakers‘ home districts — a precondition for
labeling something pork.‖157 For example, the late Senator Robert Byrd (D.,
W. Va.), proudly described himself as the ―Prince of Pork‖ for his ability to
158
direct federal projects into his home state. Among his successes:
There are two Robert C. Byrd United States Courthouses, four
Robert C. Byrd stretches of highway, freeway, expressway and
drive, and a Robert C. Byrd Bridge. And two Robert C. Byrd
Interchanges to reach these valuable amenities. There is the Robert
C. Byrd Lifelong Learning Center, the Robert C. Byrd Hardwood
Technology Center, the Robert C. Byrd Health and Wellness
Center, and the Robert C. Byrd Institute for Advanced Flexible
159
Manufacturing.
Similarly, the advocacy group Citizens Against Government Waste
makes a practice of itemizing what it views as ―waste‖ in government
spending projects. In one recent report, the group identified some of ―the
most egregious earmarks,‖ including such items as $94.1 million for ―Levee
work (California),‖ $425 million for ―Education grants for rural areas,‖ $4
million for ―Office of Women‘s Health at Food and Drug Administration,‖
$969.65 million for ―Influenza pandemic preparedness,‖ and $1.25 billion
160
for ―Public housing agencies.‖
While it is possible that each of those
items is actually wasteful (either in their entirety or by being funded too
157

Editorial, Deadlines, War Money and Pork, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2007, at A18.
Greg Moore, U.S. Senator Robert C. Byrd Dies at 92, W. VA. GAZETTE, June 28,
2010, http://wvgazette.com/News/201006280099 (―Byrd was perhaps best known for the
way he funneled dozens of projects and millions of federal dollars to his home state, West
Virginia. He earned the sobriquet ‗the Prince of Pork‘ from some taxpayer groups — they
meant it as an insult, but Byrd wore it as a badge of honor.‖).
159
Francis X. Clines, How Do West Virginians Spell Pork? It‟s B-Y-R-D, N.Y. TIMES,
May 4, 2002, at A1.
160
Thomas Schatz, Pork Goes to War, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2007, at A27.
158
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generously in light of their long-term payoff), at least their descriptions
suggest projects that could be classified as capital spending projects. An
essential goal in creating the Growth Budget would be to move beyond
superficial labels and identify the valuable projects, to save them from a
thoughtlessly wielded budget ax.
C. Can Budget Abuses be Disciplined by the Political Process?
Adopting a system of Growth Budgeting would open up a wide array
of possible spending decisions that could be described as public
investments. For any proposed spending program, it is at least plausible to
imagine an argument that the economy will grow faster if that project is
funded. (Such arguments would, however, be subject to the kind of costbenefit accounting discussed in this article.) It is, however, possible that the
political process, for all its faults, will do a reasonably good job of
determining when spending is worth it and when it is not. This seems more
likely for some categories of spending than for others.
1.

Difficult Calls: War and Growth Budgeting

For example, spending that is related to the military generally has much
broader support than spending that benefits the poor and the socially
marginalized. While there is a colorable argument that expenditures for
carrying out wars should be subject to the same analysis that we apply to
spending on bridges, schools, nutrition, and so on, the high stakes in wars
make it difficult even to fathom a cost-benefit analysis that would satisfy
broadly held notions of what should count as worthwhile military spending.
Former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice justified the cost of military
operations in Iraq along such lines: ―There have been plenty of markers that
show that this is a country that is worth the investment, because once it
emerges as a country that is a stabilising factor, you will have a very
161
different kind of Middle East.‖
Such arguments may well be valid, as are even broader arguments that
we must be willing to pay any price to defeat an enemy and protect our very
way of life.162 As one economist put it: ―When it comes to judging whether
war is worth it, however, cost-benefit analysis is little more than educated

161

Rice Backs „Worthwhile‟ War, BBC NEWS, Dec. 22, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/
pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/6202469.stm (emphasis added).
162
See, e.g., Winston Churchill, We Will Fight on the Beaches, June 4, 1940, http://
www.fiftiesweb.com/usa/winston-churchill-fight-beaches.htm (―We shall go on to the
end, . . . we shall defend our Island, whatever the cost may be.‖).
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guessing by other means. But at least it provides a framework for where to
put the guesses.‖163
Determining the net costs of war is not merely intractable analytically,
but, as noted above, it is the kind of decision that is virtually certain to be
handled directly (if not necessarily well) by the political process. If we
decide to go to war without raising taxes, then we are implicitly deciding
that the war is a capital expenditure. If we decide to raise taxes to pay for
war, then we are either saying that it is not worth it to finance the war
through debt or that we are willing to sacrifice even more now, despite the
benefits that fighting and winning the war will bestow on future
generations.
Indeed, it seems likely that some types of spending are approved too
frequently (in a cost-benefit sense) because of their political popularity.
While troubling, that category of spending is irrelevant for the current
analysis, because popular spending is already being undertaken. Growth
budgeting, as envisioned here, is a process that opens up the possibility of
justifying spending that would otherwise not be approved, and it does so
only after passing muster on a cost-benefit basis. The Growth Budget
should pave the way for approval of high-payoff projects that would not
otherwise have been undertaken.
2.

Independent Analysts and Official Estimates

The failure to finance projects that have highly promising payoffs
might be a problem of information rather than a failure of governance. One
could imagine that Congress might simply be acting in the dark, and if
some light were to shine on the investment opportunities that it misses each
year, it would readily fund those projects.
The evidence to date, however, suggests that there is no shortage of
research available regarding a wide range of such missed opportunities.164
There appear to be many worthwhile investments that have been regularly
165
ignored,
which raises the question of why legislators are not acting on

163

Alan B. Krueger, The Cost of Invading Iraq: Imponderables Meet Uncertainties,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at C3.
164
See, e.g., William T. Dickens, et al., The Effects of Investing in Early Education on
Economic Growth, Policy Brief #153, The Brookings Institution, April 2006; see also Isaacs,
note 140.
165
Elizabeth Kolbert, Uncomfortable Science, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 22, 2010
(discussing Congress‘ failure to move forward with the Waxman-Markey bill and noting,
―Not content merely to ignore the science, [Republicans] have decided to go after the
scientists‖).
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the available evidence. One possibility is that the sources of those analyses
are of unknown quality and independence. In the cacophony of issue
advocacy in the halls of government, it might simply be too timeconsuming and contentious to figure out which research reports can be
believed and which should be ignored.
This raises the prospect that the government could clarify matters by
designating an agency that would produce reports on the long-term payoffs
of various investment projects, both by carrying out independent research
and by assessing the research carried out by nongovernmental analysts.
Congress could act on those pronouncements even if there were no
obligation to do so.
To a certain degree, this is already done. The Congressional Budget
Office166 and the Office of Management and Budget 167 provide budgetary
analyses for Congress and the Executive branch, respectively, and statistical
agencies within various cabinet departments provide useful assessments of
168
government projects.
Even if an official stamp of approval on budget
analyses could overcome the credibility problem (so long as the budget
analysts themselves maintain a reputation for independence and honesty), at
the very least it would seem necessary to designate one agency as the
source of official estimates of the payoffs of potential public investment
projects.
If there were a credible government source that determined the most
worthwhile spending projects, that agency could take on the role of
providing a sort of public shaming function. An analogy would be to the
Treasury Department‘s annual computation of ―tax expenditures,‖169 which
purport to show how the government has used the tax system to provide the
equivalent of direct spending on various politically favored items (such as
166

CBO Testimony Before the Joint Comm. on the Org. of Cong. of the U.S., 103rd
Cong. 11 (statement of Robert D. Reischauer, Dir. Cong. Budget Office, 1993), available at
http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/103xx/doc10386/1993_06_10reischauertestimony.pdf (―One of
CBO‘s most important functions is to keep track of all spending and revenue legislation
considered each year, so that the Congress can know whether it is acting within the limits set
by the annual budget resolutions.‖).
167
The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_mission/ (explaining the
primary functions of the Office of Management and Budget).
168
William F. Eddy, What Is The Statistical System?, NATIONALACADEMIES.ORG (May
8, 2009), available at http://www7.nationalacademies.org/cnstat/Eddy%20Slides%20May%
208%202009.pdf (providing an overview of the primary statistical agencies that issue data to
the cabinet departments).
169
See discussion and official estimates reprinted in WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL.,
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 9–11 (14th ed. 2006).
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owner-occupied housing, charitable contributions, etc.).170 If an official
agency were to use the Growth Budget to expose the high-payoff items that
Congress has failed to fund, it could potentially create some pressure to
fund those projects.
Additional pressure in the right direction could come from requiring
that official announcements of fiscal deficits be adjusted downward for the
amount of public investment. Doing this would not directly require
Congress to fund any specific items, but it would mean that when Congress
approved an item that would be deemed public investment, the announced
deficit would not rise.
Each of these ideas at least moves the process in the right direction, by
providing information and incentives that would increase public investment.
Nonetheless, there are stronger measures that could be used to make it even
more likely that productive investments would not be overlooked.
D. Administrative Procedures
There are a number of possible ways to use administrative processes to
bring some of the benefits of the Growth Budget to federal spending
decisions. The discussion that follows assesses several possibilities and
concludes that the best available approach would be to create a Growth
Budgeting Board (GBB), which would be empowered to determine which
spending projects would be included on a federal growth budget and would
thus not be counted in official deficit estimates. The other possibilities also
have their appealing features, as discussed below, but they ultimately seem
less promising than something along the lines sketched out for the GBB.
1.

A Quasi-Judicial Process

Perhaps the most far-reaching and detailed approach to assessing the
investment potential of various spending programs would be to create a
process modeled on administrative law courts. Under such a system, the
federal government could set up ―budget courts‖ that would be empowered
to determine whether a spending project should be added to the Growth
Budget. Such a system would have the advantages of any adversarial
process, allowing proponents of a spending plan to try to prove that the
project would provide long-term benefits, while opponents of the plan
would attempt to disprove such claims.
170

Tax expenditure analysis has been the subject of intense criticism. See Clifford
Fleming & Robert Peroni, Nice Try, Joint Tax Committee, (2008) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
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Although such a system draws on many of the best parts of the modern
administrative state, the creation and administration of such a system
presents challenges that should discourage even the most ardent advocate of
the adversarial system. To begin, it is not clear who would have standing to
argue in favor of or against any specific proposal. Presumably, members of
Congress could argue on both sides, but there might well be instances in
which no member of Congress would find it worthwhile to oppose a
particular item‘s inclusion in the Growth Budget, as well as the likelihood
of quid pro quos whereby members would agree not to challenge each
other‘s favored projects. It would be possible to grant standing to interested
parties who study these issues, such as the various government watchdog
groups that currently issue public information about government spending
and waste, but there is no obvious way to limit the pool of potential litigants
in a principled way.
In addition to standing, these administrative law courts would need
rules of evidence and standards of proof to apply in their decisions.
Congress, in enabling legislation, could specify these rules up to a point,
and there is at least some likelihood that a consensus of best practices
would emerge relatively quickly in these cases. Even so, if there were more
than one administrative law judge hearing these cases, there would be a
distinct possibility of inconsistent decisions.
Ultimately, an administrative law approach to growth budgeting seems
unwieldy and expensive. It is thus unnecessary to explore these and related
technical issues, such as how judges would be selected for such a system,
the standards and venue for appeals, etc. Suffice it to say that any system of
this sort would be likely to founder on the administrative complexity
involved. Because of its inherent complexity, moreover, the administrative
law approach would also be likely to fail to provide timely decisions. If
Congress needs decisions quickly, a quasi-judicial process seems the least
appropriate way to proceed.
Despite the flaws of a system of administrative courts, such a system is
useful to consider because of the light it sheds on the other possible
approaches discussed below. Were it not for its high transaction costs
(broadly defined), the administrative law approach would have much to
recommend it. The more workable alternatives should at least offer the
possibility of capturing some of the advantages that are gained from
evidence-based decision-making by qualified decision makers.
2.

Blue-Ribbon Commissions
At the opposite end of the spectrum from administrative courts, in
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terms of institutional complexity, are Congressionally mandated expert
commissions. The federal government has previously set up, in addition to
simple fact-finding commissions, expert commissions that provide
Congress with reports that require legislative action. The most famous of
these in recent memory was the commission that drew up a list of military
bases that would be closed under a broad consolidation plan to reduce
spending on facilities that had outlived their usefulness.171 The commission
was not directly empowered to close any bases, but Congress agreed in
advance that its proposals would be voted as a single slate. 172 This was
designed to get around the problem of special pleading, in which every
member of Congress had an incentive to fight to keep open the facilities in
her state or district, and no other member found it worthwhile to fight
against a motivated colleague. 173
The base-closing commission has generally been hailed as a success,
and it certainly provides a model for possible action. 174 Recently, a member
of Congress proposed a similar type of commission to ―look at the tax code
and the array of entitlement programs and produce a set of
recommendations . . . to put them on a fiscally sustainable course.‖175 This
proposal has not been enacted, but it suggests that there is concern that
Congress‘s normal processes will never produce needed reforms of the tax
code, Medicare, etc.
This type of commission, however, seems ill-suited to deal with the
issues that motivate a call to adopt growth budgeting. The issues considered
by the base-closing commission or the proposed tax and entitlements
commission, even though they arise on a continuous basis, can be handled
periodically. That is, while one could imagine having a base-closing
171

See Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission, BRAC.GOV, http://www.
brac.gov/About.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (describing BRAC‘s function and most
recent 2005 Commission Report).
172
See Fred Hiatt, Fixing the Budget In the Worst (But Only) Way, WASH. POST, Apr.
12, 2009 (―Recognizing that the Pentagon operated too many facilities but that no legislator
would vote to close a base in his or her own district, Congress set up a Defense Base Closure
and Realignment Commission (BRAC), which came up with a rational downsizing plan.
Congress had to vote for the whole list or nothing at all; there could be no special
pleading.‖).
173
See id.
174
The so-called Greenspan Commission, which created a plan to change the financing
of Social Security in 1983, is another example of a commission that is widely thought to
have been a success.
175
Editorial, The Everything Commission: Can Congress and the President Get the
Fiscal House in Order — or Must that Job be Outsourced?, WASH. POST, June 13, 2006, at
A20.
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commission that issued reports every year, it is also relatively harmless to
have the commission do its work once and go out of existence until and
unless Congress decides to go through the process again. A full-scale
rewriting of the tax code could also be a one-time (or at least occasional)
exercise.
By contrast, the annual budgeting process is always filled with
decisions about whether some items could have long-term payoffs; so it
would seem wise to create a system that is ongoing rather than ad hoc. If
such a commission were to become a permanent part of the budget process,
however, it would cease to be a ―commission‖ in the sense in which that
176
term is often used. Instead, it would become an administrative agency of
the sort discussed below.
3.

The Fiscal Fed

Where adjudicative processes are inappropriate, and where political
decision-making is possibly tainted, agency decision-making based on
professional expertise is often the best alternative. Congress could create a
system for determining fiscal policy that is politically insulated, that draws
on the best available knowledge, and that employs trained decision makers.
Indeed, Congress did just that for monetary policy when it created the
Federal Reserve System in 1913.177 Although the Fed‘s actions can be
reversed through legislation — indeed, the Fed itself can be abolished by
legislation — it has been delegated complete authority in determining
monetary policy. 178
It would be possible for Congress to do the same with fiscal policy,
creating a so-called Fiscal Fed to take over policy-making with regarding to
government spending and taxation. Using the Fed itself as a model, or
developing an alternative, one could imagine a system in which Congress
176

Matthew Eric Glassman, Cong. Research Serv., Congressional Commissions:
Overview, Structure, and Legislative Considerations, 2–4 (2008), available at
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40076_20081219.pdf (―While no legal definition exists for
what constitutes a ‗congressional commission,‘ in this report a congressional commission is
defined as a multi-member independent entity that (1) is established by Congress, (2) exists
temporarily, (3) serves in an advisory capacity, (4) is appointed in part or whole by Members
of Congress, and (5) reports to Congress.‖).
177
See generally Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522 (1913) (establishing the
federal reserve system); see also Gyung-Ho Jeong et al., Political Compromise and
Bureaucratic Structure: The Political Origins of the Federal Reserve System, 52 J.L. &
ECON. 472, 476–82 (2009) (discussing the Federal Reserve‘s insulation from political
influence).
178
See 12 U.S.C. §§ 221–522.
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delegates its authority over fiscal policy to a board of experts.179 Such a
move would remove from Congress‘s direct authority decisions that might
better be handled by experts who are not worried about raising funds for
their re-election campaigns.
The most obvious reason to suspect that Congress would never agree to
create such an agency is that much of its power and influence derives from
its power of the purse. If one goal of a Representative or a Senator is to be
re-elected, and if the electoral system will continue to require fund-raising,
it is easy to see why Congress would not want to create a Fiscal Fed.
Moreover, even a legislator whose motives went beyond political survival
could sincerely argue that decisions about taxing and spending should not
be isolated from the political process. One could readily believe that the
value of representative democracy would be seriously diluted if only
noneconomic issues were the subject of direct congressional action.
4.

The Growth Budgeting Board (GBB)

Fortunately, the advantages of agency decision-making can be
harnessed for the purposes identified in this article without a wholesale
abdication by Congress of its fiscal policy-making powers. A ―miniature‖
Fiscal Fed, with responsibility only over identifying the short-run and longrun spending that can be financed by deficits, would still leave Congress
with ample responsibilities in setting fiscal policy — determining the level
and content of spending, the level of tax receipts, the design of the tax code,
etc.
This mini-Fiscal Fed, which could be called the Growth Budgeting
Board, could be empowered to carry out two basic functions: (1) to identify
when short-run changes in government deficits can be designated as antirecessionary, allowing such deficits to be created for a limited period of
time, and (2) to gather evidence regarding spending projects that might
finance worthy long-term investments and that should be put on a growth
budget. This centralized process would allow the board‘s members to make
179

The constitutionality of such a plan could be in doubt. Some argue, in fact, that the
Fed itself was an unconstitutional delegation of authority. See, e.g., Ashvin Pandurangi, How
Did A Single Unconstitutional Agency Become The Most Powerful Organization In
America?, BusinessInsider, Nov. 7, 2010, http://www.businessinsider.com/fed-isunconstitutional-2010-11 (―The most powerful, influential economic policy-making
institution in the country, the Federal Reserve (‗Fed‘), is an unelected body that is
completely unaccountable to the people. Well, let‘s back up and start with the fact that this
institution‘s very existence is most likely unconstitutional.‖); Bill Denman, THE AM. VIEW
BLOG (Oct. 27, 2005), http://www.theamericanview.com/forums/showthread.php?t=299
(explaining why, in his view, the Federal Reserve Board is not constitutional).
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group decisions about whether financing a project through borrowing would
be advantageous to future growth.
Congress has, in fact, already at least talked about creating some type
of administrative agency to deal with a few aspects of annual budgeting
decisions, including consideration of a so-called ―infrastructure bank.‖
The [2009 stimulus] bill could create a small-scale version of an
―infrastructure bank,‖ a free-standing entity that could make more
merit-based decisions than Congress does (an idea that Mr. Obama
supports). The bill could also finance the creation of new state
offices to conduct cost-benefit analyses.180
These discussions are apparently limited to infrastructure projects
(which, as noted above, are only one sub-category of the universe of
spending projects that could qualify for inclusion in the Growth Budget),
but there is no reason why the concept could not be expanded.
If Congress were to create a Growth Budgeting Board, it would need to
decide whether the proposed agency‘s decisions would be advisory or
would become law (possibly subject to an override process), but the most
important step is to provide some rationality to the system. If a member of
Congress, an industry group, or a public advocacy organization wanted the
GBB to move a spending program to the Growth Budget, they would have
to provide some meaningful evidence that the project would actually pay
off. ―The current system is so inefficient that even a minimal amount of
change would represent progress. If you want your project moved to the
front of the line, you should have to come to Washington bearing hard
data — not flimsy boosterism — about its economic and environmental
benefits.‖181
Perhaps the most important question in designing the GBB is the
degree of certainty that it must find before determining that a spending item
should be added to the Growth Budget. Should it use the fiscal equivalent
of ―beyond a reasonable doubt,‖ or ―more likely than not,‖ or ―clear and
convincing evidence‖? Because of the uncertainty associated with the state
of the art in budget projections, and because there should be a presumption
against allowing spending to be financed by borrowing, the standard should
probably be set rather high — certainly high enough (say, a 75% or even a
90% probability) that we would generally not borrow to pay for items that
do not justify their financing costs.
180
181

B1.

Leonhardt, supra note 130.
David Leonhardt, Piling Up Monuments of Waste, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, at
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Even with a strong presumption against categorizing a project as public
investment, however, this would still be an improvement over the current
situation. Some ―low-hanging fruit,‖ such as the early childhood education
programs noted above, should easily clear any hurdle and be approved for
the Growth Budget. Those easy decisions alone could more than justify the
effort.
E. Pre-Screening and Post Mortem Assessments
An administrative decision-making process along the lines of the
proposed Growth Budgeting Board would have the ability both to prescreen projects for possible inclusion in the Growth Budget (that is, to issue
advisory opinions) and to assess after the fact whether projects had actually
paid off. Pre-screening would enhance the prospects of funding promising
projects, by making them look ―less expensive‖ than if they were on the
operating budget, meaning that Congress would not need to decide to, say,
cut funds for cancer research in search of a balanced budget.
Having a list of pre-screened public investment projects would be
particularly helpful when Congress needs to fund economic stimulus.
During the debate in early 2009 over the economic stimulus bill, one
concern was that it would take too long to approve some public investment
projects and begin to spend the money. 182 The GBB could include in its
assessments of possible spending projects the time line of spending entailed
by each project, allowing Congress to determine whether the project fits
into a reasonable time line. More important, simply having such a list
would mean that there would be projects that have already been reasonably
vetted and have been screened for inclusion in the Growth Budget, giving
decision-makers the ability to move up the starting date on such projects.
This would naturally dovetail with the Board‘s duty to identify when shortrun spending projects can be justified as anti-recessionary.
Since part of the point of a growth budget is to determine whether we
are spending money on projects with long-term payoffs or that provide only
short-term consumption, the GBB could assess retrospectively whether its
earlier decisions (positive and negative) have been correct. If an item was
not approved for the Growth Budget but was funded anyway and turned out
to produce growth, it would be possible to update the national accounts later
to reflect that fact. Similarly, mistakes in the opposite direction would need
182
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to be corrected. In either case, this process of post-decision screening would
allow Congress to determine whether to continue to fund projects that are
already underway.
While by no means the cure to all of our fiscal problems, the proposed
Growth Budgeting Board could provide useful information for Congress to
take into account in setting its budget. Much institutional detail obviously
remains to be determined, but as a starting point, the GBB offers the
promise of bringing needed professional expertise to the process of
determining whether to spend money on short-run stimulus and on projects
that offer potential long-term returns that could benefit us all in the future.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. government has, for almost eighty years, taken an active role
in trying to end and reverse economic downturns, reflecting a commitment
to maximize the economic well-being of its citizens in the short run. In
addition, one of the core concerns of government budgeting is the impact
that decisions to spend and tax today will have on living standards in the
long run. Given the recent severe economic recession and its painful,
ongoing aftermath, and given opportunities to spend government funds on
projects with long-term benefits — such as cancer research, education at all
levels, technology incubation, high-speed rail, advanced electrical grids,
and so on — I propose that the U.S. federal government create a Growth
Budgeting Board (GBB). The GBB would be empowered as an independent
government agency, to guide government budgeting decisions in both the
short run and the long run.
In the short run, the GBB would identify spending that can be justified
as a short-term response to an economic downturn, allowing the
government to run ―good deficits‖ that would bring the economy back to
health as quickly as possible. In addition, the GBB would adopt a variation
on capital budgeting described herein as Growth Budgeting. Such an
accounting system would permit the GBB to determine which projects
provide no long-term benefits (and therefore must be financed by current
taxation), and which projects can (because they will create benefits in the
future that exceed borrowing costs) be financed through annual deficit
spending. That is, it could identify ―good deficits‖ that raise long-run
growth. Administered in a principled way, a Growth Budgeting system
could result in higher future living standards, even when the government
increases its outstanding debt each year.
The potential danger in adopting a Growth Budget lies in its ability to
make some spending projects appear to be less expensive than they actually
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are. If an item is included on a capital budget, this frees legislators to
approve the item without making the difficult choices necessary to fund a
project from current revenues. Therefore, it is necessary to discipline this
process by adopting safeguards to insure that the Growth Budget will
include only items that are truly worthwhile long-term investments. After
discussing a range of possible administrative systems that could prevent
such abuse, ranging from one-time expert commissions to full-scale
adjudicative processes, this article concludes that creating the proposed
GBB would be the best method to discipline a Growth Budgeting system.
The central messages of this article are that the federal government
must continue to be actively involved in ending recessions, and that it is
possible to adopt modern methods of budget accounting (already common
in the private sector and in other governments) that will guide spending
decisions away from waste and toward projects that will improve living
standards, today and in the future. While there are many areas of reasonable
disagreement over the administrative details involved in adopting the
proposed reforms, those details should not prevent us from making concrete
progress in our efforts to have the government spend responsibly, now and
in the future.

